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To the cosmic game of hide and seek... 
  




This dissertation reads the works of two contemporary philosophers together in order to 
build new and synthetic conversations about nature, technology, artistic expression, and 
consciousness. The first philosopher, David Abram, is a pioneer of 'ecophenomenology', which 
brings the phenomenological writings of Martin Heidegger and Maurice Merleau-Ponty into 
dialogue with contemporary ecological concepts and environmental philosophy. Abram argues 
that humans have a fundamental psychological need for sensuous, bodily, and reciprocal 
encounters with the natural world (what he terms the 'more-than-human' world).  
The second philosopher is Bernard Stiegler, known as a famous philosopher of 
technology and former student of Jacques Derrida. Using a very broad definition of technology, 
Stiegler came to notoriety for defining humans as 'always, already technological', arguing that 
our consciousness has always been shaped by technology. His later work explores how new 
technologies limit human spirit while simultaneously creating unprecedented opportunities for 
self-expression, artistic expression, and political realities.  
By reading these philosophers together, the dissertation argues that despite differences in 
academic discipline, genre, language, and cultural context, these thinkers address the same basic 
issues about human consciousness which opens possibilities for environmentalists, artists, and 
technologists to address global climate chaos, industrial populism, and disruptive technological 
innovation. By turning the authors’ concepts back unto philosophy itself, the thesis also speaks to 
the ecological and pharmacological dynamics of philosophical encounter. 
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Introduction: 
The Chance for Coherence 
 
The great trend in the human experience could be summarized as a move towards 
technology and away from ecology. This has taken on especial concern recently as the impact of 
our technology on our global environment is inescapable. This poses something of a paradox: the 
turning-towards technology and the turning-away from ecology seems in some ways the natural 
course of human (or even transhuman) development, yet it seems to put us at existential risk in the 
long-term while contributing to our general malaise in the present. The relatively recent invention 
of the Internet brought to new registers our ability to communicate and access knowledge. At the 
same time, there is a sense that our social and psychological lives are struggling to stay afloat in a 
sea of information which pulls us in all directions and climate scientists have confirmed suspicions 
that the earth is ill after centuries of human exploitation. Grand narratives of world-wide 
technological disruption and climate disaster are the alarm bells that ring today, and underneath 
these sirens runs a deep drone of cultural and psychic disenchantment.  
Among this noise, however, there are voices encouraging us to reassert our titles as clever 
and oddly adaptable creatures. We are playful tool-makers, cooperative actors, and wielders of that 
most powerful faculty, language. Inside every homo sapien is homo faber, homo luden, and homo 
grammaticus. To reconcile our paradoxical situation, we must look at that which is present in both 
technological and ecological confusion- human beings. By examining the works of French 
philosopher of technology, Bernard Stiegler (whose view of human beings is that we have always 
been formed by and engaged with technics) and American environmental philosopher and cultural 
ecologist David Abram (whose view is that we are inescapably ecological) in context with one 
another, we can develop an understanding of human beings as techno-ecological in nature. 
Through this nuanced understanding, we can not only begin to develop more effective ways to 
engage with the interplay of technology and ecology in education, art, and politics; we can also 
recognize philosophy as an important technic itself as well as an environment.  
Surprisingly, Stiegler and Abram’s reenchantment philosophies are nowhere mentioned in 
the same literature. This thesis will show that, in part, this is due to the geo-cultural divisions 
between the two philosophers and will argue for the greater interaction of Continental and 
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American philosophies. Additionally, the aesthetic differences in Stiegler and Abram’s work make 
the direct comparison of the two challenging. Nonetheless, the importance of a hybrid approach as 
a mechanism for greater understanding of the human experience is clear. Thus, this thesis asks two 
central questions. Firstly, How can synthesizing Abram’s reciprocal and bodily environmentalism 
with Stiegler’s concepts of originary technicity, general organology, and pharmakon help us build 
philosophy which embraces ecology while being better-equipped to deal with technics? and 
secondly, How can we critically understand the writings of Abram and Stiegler from 
pharmacological and ecophenomenological perspectives in order to understand philosophy as a 
‘technics of repair’, thus deconstructing 20th century Western philosophy via the question of 
technics?  
Underlying these questions is a hypothesis that a synthesis of their works provides a 
contribution to the ecophenomenological tradition that can help artists, educators, and philosophers 
to understand the limits and possibility inherent in technology and to broaden their definition of 
environment. The hope here is that teasing out a common method in Abram and Stiegler’s work 
will offer readers a strategy for overcoming false and blinding conceptual hierarchies. This thesis 
is concerned with a specific few of those binaries: nature and technology, theory and practice, 
expression and calculation, mind and matter. Developing a ‘technics of repair’ permits the thesis 
call for new roles for Western philosophy and new metaphors for the philosopher.  
The comparative analysis and attempted synthesis is justified by the basic structural 
similarities in the critiques of the two philosophers and simultaneous variance of their cultural, 
linguistic, and disciplinary contexts. That the philosophers are geo-culturally disparate 
contemporaries who approach similar problems to similar ends encourages an analysis of the 
dynamics of communication and place in contemporary philosophy. A synthesis of their concepts 
and philosophical styles serves as more than an ecological or technological metaphor however. It 
represents an attempt to overcome distance and difference on multiple levels. And so how to 
proceed?  
The work begins with a survey of literature on ecocriticism and phenomenology which 
serve as an academic locus of encounter between environmental philosophy and philosophy of 
technology. The purpose here is to point out the cultural, linguistic, and historical dynamics which 
shape the academic fields and the knowledge they produce. This sets an initial framework for 
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understanding the need for increased dialogue across continents, languages, and academic 
disciplines in order to create consilience in the knowledge we create.  
Next, there is a chapter presenting the works of each of the philosophers. This section 
emphasized how the philosophers extend the thinking of their predecessors to generate parallel 
critiques of modern society based in a critical genealogy of technics. This opens up to a second 
chapter exploring how a synthesis of their works constitutes a ‘technics of repair’ for both 
disenchanted readers and for philosophic writing. It turns their concepts back onto the phenomenon 
of contemporary philosophy itself in order to explore its ecological and pharmacological dynamics. 
It ultimately argues for epistemic humility in philosophy. It proceeds in two parts. The first section 
argues that the underlying shared method of Abram and Stiegler’s philosophies of re-enchantment 
equates technological competence with an understanding of its origins. The second half brings 
together Abram’s ecological concepts and notions of reciprocity with Stiegler’s originary 
technicity and general organology to evaluate philosophy as a phenomenon we encounter and 
participate in which has an organological and pharmacological dynamic.  
This thesis is limited in scope to an analysis of the first of Abram and Stiegler’s books. It 
necessarily touches upon the work of their influences but simply cannot account for the hundreds 
of books, articles, public lectures, online essays, and video discussions that both men have 
generated. By focusing only on their foundational texts, the thesis attempts to remain calm and 
resist the very problems being addressed by the philosophers: technological disorientation by way 
of information overload and disconnect from the world by way of using the written word too much 
as mirror and not enough as window. Let us not get stuck in the chamber of self-reflection 
The overarching claim of this thesis is that way to overcome the limitations of these 
philosopher’s works is through an application of their core concepts to the object of philosophy 
itself. That is to say, that understanding philosophy as a phenomenon we encounter as both 
pharmacological and ecological in nature is a crucial step to creating philosophy in the 21st century 
which embraces both technological and ecological issues with appropriate conceptual equipment 
and skill. This project is a way of advocating for compassion and self-sameness as methods in 
philosophy motivated by two beliefs: the impact of philosophy on society is reciprocal and 
recursive, and the co-constitutive and relational nature of phenomena means that the best way to 
overcome malaise is through deconstruction of the privileging of the self over the other, which 
results in transformation for all parties. If the thesis is successful, it will have hinted at a 
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pharmacological and ecophenomenological approach to 21st-century philosophy that does poetic 
justice and honor to the works of the men at hand and to their predecessors.  
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Chapter One: 
Environmental Thought and Technology: The Gateless Gate 
 
In 2014, Oxford University Press published The Oxford Handbook of Ecocriticism as a 
response to exponential growth in academic work at the intersection of literary theory, continental 
philosophy, and urgent global environmental crisis. Ecocriticism as a field ‘emerged as a 
movement among literary scholars in the early 1990s, born of an awareness of environmental crisis 
and a desire to be part of the solution.’1 As per the handbook, the past 25 years or so have seen a 
near exponential growth of publications in the field and increased engagement with literary theory 
and continental philosophy.2 The work of European philosophers ‘help ecocritics to theorize 
connections between literature, the environment, and, for example, the nature of language, 
textuality, perception of space, construction of difference, species boundaries, social class, power, 
risk, ideology, agency, human psychology, epistemology, and ontology.’3 Not mentioned 
explicitly above, is the relationship of any of these inquiries to the question of technology. This 
does not mean that technology is not addressed by ecocritics. It seems, however, to support a 
central claim of French philosopher Bernard Stiegler: that the question of technology has been and 
continues to be suppressed in philosophy. Insofar as Stiegler's work explores the perceptual 
implications of technology, it is relevant to ecologically-minded humanities work through what it 
can contribute to one of its foundational philosophical arms: the field of ecophenomenology.  
In order to understand how the question of technics is essential to ecophenomenology- a 
central goal of this thesis- it is necessary to understand the history of the discipline in terms of its 
central thinkers and major themes and how phenomenology has formed the philosophical basis for 
the distinct disciplines of environmental philosophy and philosophy of technology. 
Phenomenology was originally developed a series of conceptual tools for understanding 
consciousness and challenging the epistemological foundations of naturalistic science. As a 
historical philosophical movement, it is associated with such thinkers as Edmund Husserl, Martin 
Heidegger, Maurice Merleau-Ponty and existentialist Jean-Paul Sartre. During the 20th century, it 
                                                        
1 The Oxford Handbook of Ecocriticism, ed. by Greg Garrard (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 
2014), p. ix. 
2 Ibid, p. x  
3 Ibid. 
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was widely adopted by scholars in the arts and humanities and has been particularly useful to 
developing thought about the relationship between our lived experience, ecology, and culture. 
Despite advances in naturalistic science and analytic philosophy, phenomenology has been ‘set 
apart from other theoretical methods by its unique capacity for bringing to expression, rather than 
silencing, our relation with nature and the experience of value rooted in this relation.’4 
Though a broad tradition with a vast number of concerns, there has always been a recurrent 
turn to ecological reflection in the work of 20th-century phenomenologists such as Husserl, and 
especially existentialist phenomenologists such as Martin Heidegger, Emmanuel Levinas, and 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty.5 Husserl’s early concepts of intersubjectivity, temporality, and perception 
were necessarily concepts dealing with relationships that were not subject to reduction or objective 
data. Heidegger resisted what he saw as Husserl’s tendency towards subjectivism and worked to 
understand how our states of consciousness fit within and are shaped by a larger existence which 
we may not always be aware of. Merleau-Ponty challenged Cartesian mind-body dualism and 
changed the way 20th-century philosophy understood the centrality and primacy of the body and 
human language to perception. These foundational developments set the stage for the emergence 
of ecophenomenology as a cross-disciplinary inquiry in the 1990s at the junction of 
phenomenology and ecological thinking.  
Ecophenomenology grew markedly out of the work of American philosopher, David 
Abram. Abram's widely read The Spell of the Sensuous (1997) introduced Merleau-Ponty's 
thinking to North American environmentalists by updating an American Transcendentalist writing 
tradition – itself with roots in German romanticism – with philosophical accounts of the body, 
writings on the perceptual implications of the technology of writing and language, and animistic 
thinking. The work expressed the concerns of many environmentalists at the time who were 
struggling to articulate the psychological and perceptual realities of global climate change. 
Ecophenomenology thrives in part because of its rapid applicability and relevance beyond 
philosophy. This is especially true for therapy and arts practices. Therapists who wish to address 
the relationship between exposure to nature and psychological health have used 
ecophenomenology to develop an ecotherapy approach. Insofar as ecophenomenology helps us 
                                                        
4 Eco-Phenomenology: Back to the Earth Itself, eds. Charles S., Brown and Ted Toadvine (Albany, NY: 
State University of New York Press, 2003), p. xii. 
5 Ibid, p. xii. 
  12 
interpret sensual experience, it is also of great use to artists who wish to engage ecological or 
psychological themes in their work. Ecotherapy takes psychotherapy from the couch to the woods, 
so to speak, redirecting 20th century psychology towards questions concerning man’s relationship 
with nature. It begins with a fundamental belief that humans evolved as physiological beings in 
intimate contact with the natural world and that our cognitive abilities and our psychological health 
depend on intimacy with the patterns of the natural world. Our current build environments have 
left us with a wounded or undeveloped relationship with nature and many of our psychological 
and social problems stem from what a 'nature-deficit disorder.’6 According to this definition 
‘nature-deficit disorder’, when we cannot identify as part of nature, we have no integration in our 
identities and have a destructive and discordant relationship with the natural world instead of 
conceiving of it as integral to our well-being. Thus, ecological destruction constitutes self-abuse. 
To remedy this tendency, ecotherapists prescribe a mixture of scientific engagement with nature, 
Jungian depth psychology, and expressive arts. Abram specifically works with place-based song, 
dance, and mythopoetic storytelling. Despite its utility and appeal, the notion of a ‘nature-deficit 
disorder’ is not universally accepted. It has been criticized as a misdiagnosis that relies too heavily 
on a problematic ‘fall-recovery’ narrative and prevents a deeper engagement with the psyche and 
critical analysis of the cultural origins of our current relationships to nature.7 Regardless, it is a 
prime example of how phenomenology has informed environmental thought and practice. 
Phenomenology has also been crucial to the development of contemporary humanities-
style philosophy of technology, one of the few examples of a philosophical branch that does not 
conform to Stiegler’s central claim that thinking technics has been suppressed. Humanities-style 
philosophy of technology is distinct from analytical philosophy of technology by its focus on the 
nature and implications of technology as it relates to society.8 Analytic philosophy of technology, 
which emerged separately in the 1960s, is analogous to a philosophy of engineering practice which 
attempts to understand technology through exploring how it relates to science and the central role 
                                                        
6 For a deep look at the concept, see Louv, Richard. Last Child in the Woods: Saving Our Children From 
Nature-Deficit Disorder. Updated 
and Expanded edition. Chapel Hill, N.C: Algonquin Books, 2008. 
7 Elizabeth Dickinson, ‘Ecocultural Conversations: Bridging the Human-Nature Divide through Connective 
Communication Practices’, Southern Communication Journal 81, no. 1 (January 1, 2016): 32–48. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/1041794X.2015.1065289. 
8 Pieter Vermaas, and others, ‘A Philosophy of Technology: From Technical Artefacts to Sociotechnical 
Systems.’ Synthesis Lectures on Engineers, Technology, and Society 6, no. 1 (January 14, 2011): 1–134. 
https://doi.org/10.2200/S00321ED1V01Y201012ETS014. 
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design and team decision-making plays the emergence of technological artifacts. (Ibid) In general, 
though philosophical inquiry regarding technology is present from the beginning of Western 
philosophy, contemporary humanities philosophy of technology developed disproportionately to 
the rate of technological innovation. It surfaces in the 19th century, with the work of Ernst Kapp 
and becomes a concern for more philosophers throughout the 20th century, including John Dewey, 
Hannah Arendt, and Heidegger. 
Heidegger’s phenomenological approach to technology, which is central to Stiegler’s 
project, is based on the idea that our contemporary way of approaching the world as shaped by 
technology amounts to seeing the world as a stockpile of resources for our use and disposal. 
Merleau-Ponty’s approach to perception, Abram’s largest influence, shows that our consciousness 
is always bodily, reciprocal, and environmental. This has implications for society insofar as the 
way we treat nature or environment is self-same to the way we treat each another and ourselves. 
Seen in this light, phenomenological thinking about technology and environment becomes a way 
to think about how we in the contemporary West relate to worldly phenomena in general and 
becomes an important tool to understand the technological genesis of our current ecological, social, 
and psychological crises. Contemporary philosophical approaches to technology9 have largely 
extended the work of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, thinking with and against them to develop 
technological ethics and address technological disorientation. 
Seeing how phenomenology has contributed thoroughly to the development of both 
contemporary environmental philosophy and philosophy of technology which embraces ecological 
thinking, it is worth asking why the fields remain segregated to the degree they do and why 
ecophenomenology and ecocrticism do not more actively incorporate technological thinking. For 
instance, Stiegler, despite his sophisticated and contemporary approaches to thinking the co-
individuation of humans, technology, and environment, is largely absent in the literature of 
contemporary environmental philosophy. He is widely present across current media, arts, and 
culture scholarship and even works regarding technology and education, however, he barely 
                                                        
9 For further information see works by Albert Borgmann, Technology and the Character of Contemporary 
Life: A Philosophical Inquiry: A Philosophical Enquiry.(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 
Hubert L. Dreyfus, What Computers Still Can’t Do: A Critique of Artificial Reason (Cambridge, MA: MIT 
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appears in ecocritical readers or works directly dealing with environmental philosophy. He 
receives one sentence on page 65 of the Cambridge Introduction to Literature and the Environment 
(2011), no mention in Ecocritical Theory: New European Approaches (2011), and no mention in 
Routledge's Ecocriticism: The Essential Reader (2015). Andrew McMurry10 briefly mentions 
Stiegler in his broad-sweeping chapter on media determinism and ecocriticism in The Oxford 
Handbook of Ecocriticism, ‘Media Moralia: Reflections on Damaged Environments and Digital 
Life’ (2014). McMurry extends Stiegler's notions of cinematic consciousness and the capacity that 
the culture industries have for synchronizing behavior to new forms of media, stating that 
cinematic consciousness is giving way to a ‘fragmented, saccadic drift of the Internet mind, open 
to the lure of personalized Google ads and on-click ordering buttons.’11 McMurry reminds us that 
despite our hyper-connected technological circumstances ‘[...] ecocritics cannot go too far along 
the road with Kittler or Stiegler toward the media-determined situation.’ According to McMurry, 
‘[t]hey must continue to insist that biophysical reality forms the most profound determination of 
all.’12 Additionally, McMurry mentions technology as pharmakon, clearly inspired by though with 
no explicit reference to Stiegler's work. He recalls Plato's Phaedrus, anamnesis and hypomnesis, 
to ask; ‘does the hyper immediacy of the digital environment poison or enhance our relationship 
with the natural one?’13 It is clear from the chapter that McMurry considers the need for ecocritics 
to better understand technology to be urgent and sees potential solutions in Stiegler’s work. Despite 
this, he engages Stiegler's work only in passing and does not deeply engage any of Stiegler’s 
arguments.  
Considering the above, it seems safe to say that contemporary philosophy of technology is 
necessarily ecophenomenological while ecophenomenology has not been as concerned with 
integrated technology as deeply into its thinking. Where ecophenomenology does a better job is 
giving voice to non-human, non-technological beings (animals, plants, ecosystems). 
Ecophenomenology offers methods and insights that can help philosophers of technology discuss 
the relationship between non-human phenomena. In a world where the boundaries between 
                                                        
10 McMurry, Andrew. "Media Moralia: Reflections on Damaged Environments and Digital Life." In The 
Oxford Handbook of Ecocriticism. : Oxford University Press, 2014-08-21. 
http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199742929.001.0001/oxfordhb-
9780199742929-e-025. 
11 Ibid, p. 496. 
12 Ibid, p. 497. 
13  Ibid, p. 492. 
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humans, technology, animals, plants, and environments becomes increasingly blurred, we need 
thinkers who can help make sense of relationships with tools appropriate to the synthetic nature of 
the phenomena. Luckily, increasing cross-fertilization between Europe and North American 
academic philosophy is bridging the gap, despite the cultural, linguistic, and disciplinary barriers 
that remain. For instance, French environmental thought is currently making its way into North 
American environmental philosophy thanks to translations and anthologies that encourage 
dialogue between environmental philosophy and continental philosophy.   
Though Stiegler is yet to be included in much environmental scholarship, another, perhaps 
lesser-known French philosopher of technology and environment, Bernard Charbonneau, appears 
alongside the work of David Abram and other conversations about the relationship between 
Continental thought and environmental philosophy. In 2004’s important volume, Rethinking 
Nature: Essays in Environmental Philosophy, Daniel Cérézuelle presents an introductory 
overview of Charbonneau, who ‘is now considered by intellectual historians to be one of the 
founders of the French ecology movement.’14 Charbonneau, alongside Jacques Ellul, wrote 
extensively on issues of technology, political ecology, and the dehumanization of man. In 
Charbonneau’s thought, we use technology to escape the confines of nature, but in the process 
submit to a totalitarian system that undermines any previous hope we had to achieve personal 
freedom. The acceleration of the pace of modern life- and the complexity and chaos brought about 
by technologization- exacerbates our desire to control and ‘results in organizations that are more 
and more powerful, but also more and more complex and, therefore, fragile.’15 If we wish to have 
any chance at freedom, we need to better understand how the dialectic between system and chaos 
is agitated by rapid development, putting us in ‘a paradoxical situation: a spirit of freedom has 
initiated techno-scientific and economic progress, but they result in the tendency towards strict 
social organization.’16 Charbonneau implores us to reject the logic of rapid development and 
reorient our energies towards the cultivation of Nature and Freedom. It is useful to understand 
Charbonneau and Ellul as predecessors to Stiegler’s work even though he never directly engages 
them, because they write extensively about the relationship between environment, technology, 
                                                        
  14 Cérézuelle, Daniel. "Nature and Freedom: An Introduction to the Environmental Thought of Bernard 
Charbonneau", in Rethinking Nature: Essays in Environmental Philosophy (ed. by Bruce V. Foltz and 
Robert Frodeman), Indiana University Press, 2004. p. 314. 
15 Ibid, p. 320  
16 Ibid, p. 321 
  16 
societal control and spirit.  This helps justify the case that Stiegler’s technological critique of 
industrial populism is compatible with environmentalist discourse.   
In conclusion, a survey of the literature reveals that though academic disciplines are 
increasingly cross-fertilizing, linguistic and cultural boundaries continue to shape the dynamics of 
transmission of information. The internet allows for quick communication, but geography and 
place still matter. The survey confirms that, as a cultural phenomenon, philosophy is very much 
shaped by the contexts in which it is produced. Modernist scientific endeavor has done a 
tremendous job generating coherence and concordance across the globe, however because 
contemporary philosophy, especially the phenomenological tradition, has problematized the 
epistemological validity of science, reconciling different philosophical traditions regarding 
environment and technology becomes a much more complex and delicate enterprise. Synthesizing 
these philosophies requires temperance, criticism, and a constant awareness of the utility and 
potential unintentional consequences of each new concept built. The metaphors of ecology and 
pharmacology are essential here.  
Ecocriticism shows us that we need sophisticated approaches to nature to create 
environmentalisms that match our circumstances. Philosophy of technology shows us the 
unintended social and ecological consequences brought forth by the new technologies we build. 
Much contemporary environmental and technological practice still largely rely on a nature-culture 
and nature-technology binaries which fail to capture the complexity and dynamics of our 
experience of the world. This prevents meaningful environmental and social action and hinders 
ethical approaches to the development of new technologies. If the manner in which we 
conceptualize ‘nature’ and ‘technology’ shapes how we behave, then integrating these binaries and 
thinking non-dualistically about nature and technology opens meaningful reflection about 
technology and environment in a broader sense, one that incorporates psychology and the soul. If 
the urgent environmental crisis is fundamentally also a crisis of technology and of spirit, then we 
need academic work that addresses the political and technological disorientation and 
environmental confusion we encounter at the level of the perceptual.  
The current literature associated with emerging environmental humanities and philosophy 
of technology shows that, despite shared ethical and political concerns and common philosophical 
origins, there is less interdisciplinary dialogue and cross-fertilization than one might expect, given 
that both disciplines drink largely from the same philosophical fountain. Given the interpretive 
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power of phenomenology and the rapid technological innovation at present, interdisciplinary at the 
crux of environmental humanities and philosophy of technology seems more useful than ever. 
There is a need to show the compatibility of philosophers from both disciplines. Comparing the 
work of Abram and Stiegler, then, becomes an important act both inside and beyond the academy. 
Ecological and Technological reflection in phenomenological writing is quite normal and 
the two thinkers at the center of this dissertation are not as far apart as they might seem given a 
cursory look at their different linguistic, cultural, and disciplinary contexts. That their work 
potentially transcends these barriers is also cause for a conversation about how the philosophers 
who make up the larger organism of philosophy create their work influenced by dynamic and 
continual processes of individuation and how seemingly conflicting philosophies, from a larger 
view, constitute homeostasis in philosophy itself. This dynamic in mind, let us step through the 
gateless gate. 
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Chapter Two: 
Abram and Stiegler’s Vernacular Critiques of Technics 
 
The aim of this chapter is to lay the necessary groundwork for exploring the implications 
of Abram’s ecophenomenology alongside Stiegler’s philosophy of technology. The main question 
is: To what extent is Abram’s history of our linguistic and perceptual relationship to our 
environment mutually intelligible with Stiegler’s thesis of originary technicity, general 
organology, and technology as pharmakon?  
In order to proceed in the endeavor, we need to introduce the overall scope of their projects 
and the cultural, linguistic, and philosophical heritage which inform their basic arguments. After 
providing the necessary clarification of their propositions, we will then take a deeper look at 
Abram’s critique of technics through his use of Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy of perception and 
language and his engagement with the history of alphabetic writing. This will allow us to explore 
Stiegler’s foundational concepts and analyze the extent to which their projects constitute 
vernacular iterations of a similar philosophy of technics, human origins, and spirit through 
participation. This analysis argues that the fundamental similarity in their philosophical projects 
permits and encourages a deeper relationship between environmental philosophy and philosophy 
of technology and that the keystone of this relationship is the philosophical gesture of a critique of 
origins through a reading of technics. 
Abram’s phenomenological scholarship is grounded in sensuous, bodily experience with 
clear, intimate vignettes of encounters with what he consistently terms the "more-than-human 
world". His work is noted for making a strong ecological case for increased and varied perceptual 
and linguistic engagement with nature and for revitalizing animistic thinking. His writings explore 
the possibility of repairing our relationship with the living, breathing earth by developing an 
environmental ethics which emerges from a type of direct engagement and reciprocity with the 
world that he claims was and is typical of oral cultures. Writing at the end of the 20th century, he 
offers readers a genealogy of our current ecological crisis based in a critique of the technology of 
writing and its effects on our perceptual and linguistic relations to the world around us. His work 
is explicitly motivated by a desire to revitalize ecological concepts and environmental philosophy 
in the US which he believes were conceptually impoverished at the time. 
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According to Abram, we can reinvigorate our relationship to the world and cultivate a sense of 
responsibility for life by acknowledging that the earth we inhabit and which we also constitute is 
animate and in a continual process of creation or becoming. The way we story our relationship to 
the earth changes the way we relate to it. If we choose to tell stories of mechanistic Darwinism or 
radical social constructivism and relativism, we miss out on a tremendous opportunity to relate to 
the "more-than-human" world in an animistic, reciprocal, and reverent way that Abram claims is 
common to oral cultures. This reciprocity typical to oral cultures was characterized by a tendency 
to speak directly to nature and not about it.  
We lost this reciprocity when we became increasingly enchanted by our own self-
referential systems of phonetic alphabets, which slowly severed our connection to the earth around 
us and prevents us from understanding perceptual, bodily encounters with our surroundings as a 
meaningful source of information. This resulted in a narrowing of our sense of meaningful 
engagement with the sensuous reality of the earth (with an abandonment of a phenomenological 
and mystical approach to reality). Re-animating the earth around us requires meditating on an 
ontology that permits continual connection and emergence. 
Abram brought the thought of Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty in dialogue with 
North American environmentalist writing to claim that the ecological origins of our language and 
perception has been largely forgotten. Around the same time, in the late 1990s, Stiegler was 
coming into notoriety in France for an analogous but distinct claim that the question of technology 
has been suppressed in the history of western philosophy- that philosophers have ignored that our 
consciousness is technological to begin with.  
Stiegler’s writings encompass over 30 books, dozens of articles, online lectures, and public 
talks. His overall project amounts to a post-Marxist critique of capitalism through a critical reading 
of the history of technics. Many of his later writings are applications of his earlier works to 
contemporary public or political issues. They are increasingly dependent on his foundational texts, 
which makes them highly self-referential and occasionally redundant. His foundational arguments, 
in which he argues that technics have been the repressed question throughout the history of 
philosophy despite being fundamental of our ability to retain memory and to think, are in his 
Technics and Time series. He offers three main concepts iterated across dozens of books, articles, 
and public lectures: ‘originary technicity’, ‘general organology’, and ‘pharmakon’.  
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The first concept, ‘originary technicity’, is a bold ontological claim about the nature of 
humans. Stiegler defines humans as 'always, already technological' which he uses as the basis of 
an argument that our consciousness and our physiology, and thus all philosophical inquiry, has 
always been shaped by technology. To Stiegler, since Plato, philosophers have remained blind to 
how much their own thinking comes after and fundamentally depends on technics. Stiegler then 
explores the dynamics of how human physiology and neurology and society have coevolved. To 
Stiegler, human consciousness- our awareness of time and space and our continued and 
institutionalized search for our origins- is inseparable from technical prosthesis. Understanding 
this can help us overcome the violence which often results from our obsessions with origins and 
permit post-ontological engagement with life which will help us orient ourselves in a hyper-
attentive and symbolically liquidated modernity.  
Lastly, his extension of Derrida’s concept of ‘pharmakon’, a conceptual tool for assessing 
the positive and negative consequences of a phenomenon and how society uses that phenomenon 
as a scapegoat for its ills, allows Stiegler to move past the more conservative tendencies in the 
works of thinkers of technology like Heidegger. By thinking technology pharmacologically, 
Stiegler delivers readers into a paradigm and eventually a political manifesto of expressive 
participation with new technological forms which he argues is the most reliable way to triage our 
disorientation and work our way through malaise and back into a life of spirited community.  
Importantly, both authors offer their projects as a challenge to contemporary philosophy to 
more-critically engage technics in order to become relevant beyond itself. Reflecting this concern 
is their commitment to repairing the psychological and social circumstance of their fellow man 
through philosophy is the development of associations that engage their work publicly. Stiegler is 
an increasingly popular public intellectual in France with growing impact in the English-speaking 
world. He is the founder of the association Ars Industrialis (Association Internationale Pour Une 
Politique Industrielle Des Technologies de l’esprit’)17 and Pharmakon.fr, a philosophy school in 
Epineuil-le-Fleuriel (École de philosophie d'Epineuil-le-Fleuriel). In 2006, he became Director of 
the Department of Cultural Development and later Director of the Institut de recherche et 
d'innovation (IRI) at the Centre Georges-Pompidou in Paris. Abram created the Alliance for Wild 
Ethics (AWE) “a consortium of individuals and organizations working to ease the spreading 
                                                        
17  Ars Industrialis (online blog), Accessed November 11, 2018, <http://arsindustrialis.org>   
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devastation of the animate earth through a rapid transformation of culture.”18  His site serves as 
the digital home of a growing movement of artists, media makers, philosophers, and educators 
who are dedicated to broadening and deepening our engagement with the world in an effort to 
counteract environmental degradation and crisis of the spirit.  
Their public engagement is coherent with their philosophies of reciprocity and participation 
and is interesting in what it can teach us about the way philosophy is shaped by technology. It is, 
however, also necessary to understand their projects in pharmacological terms. Before critiquing 
the potential consequences of their work, we must first enter into their work to understand how 
their critiques of technics represent parallel attempts to overcome the burden of post-structuralist 
philosophy.  
Both Abram and Stiegler approach similar subject matters while having similar underlying 
structures to the way they build their philosophies. That they create similar work in different 
writing styles and ultimately offer somewhat divergent solutions to the problems they present begs 
a conversation about the importance of having vernacular and overlapping critiques of technics 
which form constellations in philosophy that can bridge disciplines.  A look at how each builds his 
arguments is the next preliminary step to having that conversation about philosophy in the 21st 
century and to testing the limits of their works in tandem. How did Abram build one of the first 
ecophenomenological critiques of poststructuralist philosophy of language via a reading of 
technics, and how does Stiegler’s extension of the work of Heidegger and Derrida offer new ways 
of understanding how technology shapes the way we relate to our environment? 
  
                                                        
18 “The Alliance.” Alliance for Wild Ethics (online blog), Accessed July 28, 2017. <http://wildethics.org/the-
alliance/> 
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Abram’s Critique 
Merleau-Ponty, the Phonetic Alphabetic, and the Wisdom of the Body 
 
We can take Abram’s first and most influential book, The Spell of the Sensuous: Perception 
and Language in a More-Than-Human World, as representative of the core of his thinking. Despite 
the fact that he has continued to produce scholarly articles and nonfiction writing which extend his 
work into related topics such as zoosemiotics or the perceptual experience of becoming animal (in 
the Deleuzian sense of the term), it is this book which gives us the clearest means of identifying 
Abram’s original contributions to philosophy. Abram is transparent about his philosophical aims 
to extend the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty into the environmental realm. A close reading of his 
text will identify anchor points with which we can later engage his work with that of Bernard 
Stiegler.   
The book begins with a personal introduction- an autobiographical narrative which serves 
the dual function of acclimatizing readers to Abram’s literary language and telegraphing his 
phenomenological approach to perception and to the production of knowledge. Abram presents 
his philosophical project as necessarily autobiographical and experiential, an outcrop of his 
academic background in environmental studies and his time spent as a sleight-of-hand magician 
and researcher in traditional medicine alongside shamans and medicine men in Indonesia and 
Nepal. According to Abram, important to the genesis of his project is the fact that the new 
perspectives he gained about the relationship between shamanic and medicinal practice, language, 
and environment are what had definitively shifted his academic interests from the study of ecology 
to the study of phenomenology and philosophy of language, as a means of advancing an 
environmental ethics at a perceptual and psychological register.  
In his own account, Abram turned to phenomenology in an effort to bridge the gap between 
what he perceived to be a linguistically and conceptually impoverished environmentalism- which 
was at the time still relying on a false nature-culture binary- with the academic work in the field 
of ecology, the then-burgeoning Gaia theory credited to chemist James Lovelock and 
microbiologist Lynn Mergulis. Gaia theory is founded on the idea that the Earth is ‘a self-
regulating system made up from the totality of organisms, the surface rocks, the ocean and the 
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atmosphere tightly coupled as an evolving system.’19 In many ways, Abram acts as translator or 
diplomat. He manifests aspects of Gaia theory in a phenomenological mode while curating 
phenomenological ideas to readers who might find phenomenological language opaque and 
deterring. 
Abram’s basic procedures throughout this section is to systematically demonstrate how 
phenomenology can help us to overcome the epistemological and ontological limits of both overly 
rational Western scientific and philosophical thought and inadequate spiritualist or new-age 
thinking. To do this, he introduces a phenomenological concept (predominantly from Merleau-
Ponty, but also from Husserl and Heidegger), explains ways in which Western scientific or 
philosophical traditions have inadequately addressed the problem, offers dominant counter-
narratives from environmental philosophy or new age thought, then demonstrates how, despite 
superficial differences, the counterpoised positions are actually the same in type. He then returns 
to the phenomenological concept as a meaningful alternative, which he illustrates with vignettes 
of perceptual or linguistic encounters with non-human subjects.  
In this way, Abram introduces uninitiated readers to phenomenology through a brief tour 
Husserl’s concepts of the life-world and intersubjectivity, en route to the work of Merleau-Ponty. 
Firstly, following Husserl, he addresses perception as a reciprocal and participatory act between 
subjectivities. He argues that though many philosophers tend to think of subjectivities as uniquely 
human phenomena, closer examination reveals that animal subjectivities, and by extension of the 
same logic, any phenomena which is perceived, is necessarily also co-creating our perceptions. In 
this regard, perception is equated to participation. This, for Abram, justifies a phenomenological 
approach as an effective means by which to explore the root causes of our broken relationship to 
nature, because that relationship is shaped by what we understand to be the nature of perception. 
By allowing for non-human intersubjectivity, phenomenology, he claims, is concordant with the 
animistic way oral peoples experience the world, something which has been largely eclipsed in the 
literate West. In later chapters, he goes on to frame phenomenology as an attempt to return to 
preliterate ways of sensing, but before he makes that claim, he turns his attention to exploring the 
origins of this perceptual shift.  
                                                        
19 Lovelock, James. 2009. The Vanishing Face of Gaia: A Final Warning. New York: Basic Books. p. 126 
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The key difference for Abram is the distinct use of language. Following Merleau-Ponty, 
Abram sees human language fundamentally as an affective physical gesture originating in the 
carnal body and from which semantic meaning only later emerges through a complex process of 
appropriation and abstraction. Sensuous encounters with the world are thus pre-theoretical and 
pre-linguistic; our bodies are constantly sensing and perceiving the world independent of our 
linguistic engagements and they are in ceaseless conversation with other bodies and with the larger 
body of the world. Oral peoples for centuries, and still to this day, understand language in this way 
and use it to speak directly to the world around them as an act of physical and spiritual reciprocity, 
whereas literate people have come to speak primarily about the world in increasingly abstract and 
calcified language. The fundamental differences in what we understand language to be and how 
we choose to use language is a crucial paradigm for understanding how we have become cut off 
from reciprocal sensuous engagement with the world and explain how we have come to view the 
world largely as an inanimate store of resources existing for our consumption and disposal.  
Going deeper into philosophy of language, Abram introduces Merleau-Ponty’s concept of 
the ‘Flesh’- an ontological proposal concordant with the environmental term ‘biosphere’ and 
confirmed by ecological science- as a terminal critique of the linguistic science of Ferdinand de 
Saussure. Saussure famously distinguishes between la langue and la parole, offering that signs do 
not signify referents, but instead serve as markers of distance or difference from other signs. By 
showing how human speech emerges from bodily experience and is embedded in a larger matrix 
of the experienced world, Merleau-Ponty critiques de Saussure’s philosophy by showing that 
expressive speech acts are fundamentally corporal phenomena. Physical mimicry of phonological 
and expressive emotional phenomena is the primary way humans learn language and the structures 
of language emerge later as the ‘sedimented result of all previous acts of speech.’20 Just as human 
speech is a bodily phenomenon, human language is an expression of a broader ecological 
phenomenon and speech acts are continually created in dialogue with the expressive speech of the 
Earth itself. Human language is intimately formed by the language of non-human actors in a 
complex process of co-creation. This is evidenced, for example, by the relationship between the 
phonological profiles of human language and the sounds of natural landscapes.  
                                                        
20 Abram, David. The Spell of the Sensuous: Perception and Language in a More-Than-Human World.. 
New York: Vintage Books, 1997, p.84 
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Abram uses Merleau-Ponty’s critique to make the environmentalist argument that if the 
source of creativity in human language depends in part on the stimulus we receive from our 
encounters with the speech of the world (birdsong, wind, rushing water), then ecological 
degradation manifests itself in the poverty of modern language. Literate peoples rely increasingly 
on fossilized language structures and no longer see language as a way to directly commune with 
environment. In this, Abram claims that for modern literate people like ourselves, there is a 
‘double-withdrawal’ from the world- simultaneously linguistic and perceptual. Abram wishes to 
understand what the root cause of this rift might be.  In order to do so, he creates a historical 
account of how this difference in language use and perceptual engagement might have co-evolved 
as part of the same process. His account centers around the development of the technology of the 
phonetic alphabet as the main cause behind our sense of displacement and disconnect from 
sensuous encounters with the world that we co-create in a reciprocal and participatory act of 
perception. Abram makes the case that our relationship to the written word directly corresponds to 
our treatment of nature, and thus rediscovering the sensual foundations of oral speech is an 
effective way to advance environmental ethics at the level of the perceptual in so far as it revitalizes 
animistic thinking.  
Abram’s section, Animism and the Alphabet, begins by noting that many scholars in the 
past have attempted to understand our destructive relationship with nature. Some attempt to 
explain the phenomena as a facet of human nature, which to Abram, grossly ignores the fact that 
indigenous oral cultures from around the world have lived in ecological harmony for centuries (if 
not millennia). Other scholars try to explain the ecological disharmony as a byproduct of either 
Platonic essentialism of ancient Greece or resulting from the transcendental metaphysics of the 
ancient Hebrews. Abram notes that despite being different cultures in most aspects- geography, 
climate, social organization- these two cultural groups which have given rise to our current culture 
share a reliance on the technology of the phonetic alphabet. This sets the stage for his investigation 
of how the way both cultures used the written word changed the way they relate to perception and 
to the environment.  
For Abram, the written word, just like human speech, exists first and foremost as an 
ecological phenomenon. In the same way that the more-than-human world speaks out through 
animal calls or howling winds, these subjectivities also are involved in deep acts of writing. He 
gives multiple examples of the traces and marks left by animals in the snow or mud and the forms 
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of rivers and rocks, all which have the property of legibility- they are all readable phenomena. We 
have always been engaged in a reading of these landscapes and animals, and our survival as a 
species is proof of our faculties and general success in employing them. Our writing systems 
evolved as a direct result of the writing that was already taking place in the world. 
Showing that all human writing has its origins in the activity of non-human or more-than-
human subjectivities is Abram’s first direct ecological or ecophenomenological critique of post-
structuralist philosophy of writing. He understands the ‘meaning’ of all written signs- be they 
animal tracks or letters- to be an encounter with the ‘Other’, equal to a ‘meeting’. These 
philosophical terms are a way to directly engage with Jacques Derrida’s  work, Of Grammatology. 
Abram here is addressing Derrida’s concept of différance, the process by which it is impossible 
for there to be any true encounter between the author of a text and the reader of a text because the 
actual ‘meaning’ of a given text is tied up in a process of infinite differentiation and deferral to the 
meaning of other texts. Behind every text is another text. To Abram, Derrida’s argument is 
functional insofar as ‘one maintains that the other who writes is an exclusively human Other, only 
if one assumes that the written text is borne by an exclusively human subjectivity.’21 Abram 
challenges Derrida’s claim by reframing writing in ecological terms. Derrida postulates that we 
can never encounter the Other, but Abram claims that when animal subjectivities constitute this 
Other, we indeed do directly encounter the Other specifically as the mystery that always already 
is and always will be. Put differently, because the very nature of this more-than-human Other is 
fundamentally a mystery, our reading of more-than-human texts (footprints, fur sheddings, 
geological patterns) precisely constitute a ‘meeting’ with their ‘meaning’. The consequence for 
this notion is that all human texts are traceable back to texts of more-than-human subjectivities 
and thus the ‘meaning’ of a text is the ‘meeting’ with the mystery that is life before verbal 
interpretation or reflection.  
In order to make his critique, Abram works backwards in time tracing the origin of literary 
texts back to animal markings and other worldly forms. This sets the stage for an ecological 
retelling of the history of the development of the phonetic alphabet. By most measures, Abram 
follows the conventional scholarly accounts of Walter Ong, Jack Goody, and Marshall McLuhan. 
He contributes to their work by framing writing as emergent phenomena of the world itself, a 
technology which emerges from what Merleau-Ponty’s terms “the flesh of the world,” and 
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discussing the consequences of each stage of this evolution for perception and engagement with a 
more-than-human world. His overall thesis is that with each successive stage of the development 
of writing, the dependence of written characters on existing physical referents became more and 
more obscured, leading eventually to a phonetic system based on marks which represent mouth 
sounds and refers its users exclusively back to themselves. This shift in referents from the more-
than-human world to our own selves turned writing from a window to the world into a mirror, 
cutting us off from our surroundings and launching us into a way of being that is increasingly 
abstract and self-referential. Our unprecedented self-referentiality eclipses our intimate 
engagement with the world around us and leaves us cut off from the relationships that nourished 
us throughout our evolutionary history.  
Abram’s emergent alphabet begins with ‘our own tracks, our footprints, our handprints in 
mud or ash pressed upon the rock.’22 By his account, we traced these bodily and worldly forms as 
a way to participate with the world around us, eventually transforming these shapes into imagistic 
petroglyphs. These rock and cave paintings are not specifically tied to speech and so are 
conventionally considered to be a form of proto-writing. Writing becomes related to speech with 
the hieroglyphic writing system of Egypt and with its Chinese and Mesoamerican counterparts. 
These systems contain ideograms- picture-symbols which represent not what is depicted 
realistically, but instead represents a quality associated with the thing that is pictured. Abram sees 
this as the first step directing our attention away from our sensorial engagement with the world the 
pictures represent and towards the images themselves. These systems proved useful, but not fully 
adequate to represent abstract concepts and so scribes began to create rebuses- visual allusions to 
speech acts; Abram himself describes rebuses as visual puns. For Abram, the emergence of rebuses 
represents an important shift in the function of writing systems. For the first time, visual 
representations began to represent specifically the sounds of human speech instead of the meaning 
of the utterances. Because of many reasons, including the utility of rebuses for commerce between 
peoples who speak different dialects, the rebus principle did not catalyze into fully phonetic speech 
immediately or fully everywhere. It finally did, however, in the ancient Middle-East among 
Semitic peoples who, recognizing the relationship between consonants and breathed sounds, 
developed a system for representing each of their consonant sounds with a corresponding image.  
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It is with the development of the Semitic aleph-beth that Abram sees an increasing 
separation between nature and culture. Abram points out the shift, noting that up until this 
innovation,  
‘[t]he sensible phenomenon and its spoken name were, in a sense, still participant with one 
another’ whereas with the aleph-beth, ‘the written character no longer refers us to any sensible 
phenomenon out in the world, or even to the name of such a phenomenon (as with the rebus), but 
solely to a gesture to be made by the human mouth.’23 
 
The key point for Abram is that by shifting the function of the image from the representation of 
worldly phenomena to the representation of human vocal utterance, this new writing system 
reroutes the path of association and excludes the participation of the thing pictured. This symbolic 
‘bypassing’ is the key to understanding the origins of our tendency to ignore our relationship to 
phenomena. For the first time ‘the larger, more-than-human life-world is no longer a part of the 
semiotic, no longer a necessary part of the system.’24  
After making this bold and convincing claim, Abram adds a caveat. Insofar as Semitic 
letters themselves were derived from pictographs, they do still maintain a reference to worldly 
phenomena (he gives the example of the aleph as the upside-down head of an ox, which was 
corresponded to the name of the letter). These links, however, are much more fragile and vestigial- 
they have become non-essential components of the communication process. To exemplify this 
shift, Abram points to Old Testament writings in which the animals and natural phenomena that 
once spoke directly to humans had already begun to grow silent. For the ancient Hebrews, language 
was beginning to be understood as a uniquely human capacity. This is crucial to Abram’s later 
reading of the development of a world-view of human exceptionalism which emerges in dominant 
Judeo-Christian culture, but is notably and importantly absent in Jewish mystic traditions.  
The final step in the shift away from reciprocal and sensorial linguistic engagement with 
the wider world and towards increased abstraction occurs when Semitic script makes its way to 
ancient Greece. The Greek scribes, adopting the shapes and names of the Semitic letters, were 
unable to retain their original pictorial meanings. Thus, anyone reading the new Greek alphabet 
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was participating in a wholly abstracted writing system that was entirely phonetic and with no 
remaining understandable reference to the larger world.  
Abram pauses his history at this point in order to elaborate how the shift from oral culture 
to a culture dependent on phonetic writing systems fundamentally changed our relationship to 
memory, to the way we used language, and to nature. He goes deeper into other aspects of the 
linguistic issues in later chapters, focusing on the physicalization of sounds and the role of the 
breath. The remainder of the section at hand, however, focuses on linking the history of the 
alphabet back to Merleau-Ponty’s earlier concerns about the participatory nature of perception and 
to introduce his vocabulary of ‘flesh’ and ‘chiasm’. Chiasm is a term primarily used to refer to the 
symmetrical structure of a narrative which was common to ancient literature and oral poetry as a 
pneumonic and literary device. Merleau-Ponty adopted in order to express the “bi-directional 
becoming or exchange between the body and things that justifies speaking of a ‘flesh’ of things, a 
kinship between the sensing body and sensed things that makes their communication possible.”25  
In order to explore this bi-directionality inherent in the becoming of the world, Abram 
detours through a comparison of Plato’s Phaedrus to the epic ballads of Homer. He follows closely 
the work of Harvard classicists Milman Parry and Albert Lord and British classicist Eric Havelock 
in his reading, in which the Homeric epics represent the thinking of oral peoples (for reasons 
explained below) while Plato's Phaedrus story represents the origin of our modern Western 
approach to nature, which is decidedly more abstract and analytical. Abram illustrates this shift 
along two main themes. His reading centers around the way language in the two tales is a window 
into conceptions of nature, the way nature functions as a narrative device in the Homeric epics, 
and the critical attitude to nature depicted in Phaedrus. He also shows how the different styles 
represent a different relationship to memory and cognition.  
In the early 20th century Parry and Lord, according to Abram, provided us with deep 
analysis of the Homeric epics. He showed that the repetitive literary devices used in the Iliad and 
the Odyssey were actually a thoroughly developed technique of memory common to oral bards. 
This was essential to forming his hypothesis that the ballads were essentially literary transcriptions 
of oral modes of storytelling. Later on, in the 1930s, Parry was able to confirm this position through 
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a study of Slavic singers, who largely relied on the same techniques as the Homeric ballads in their 
own songcraft. Abram continues, showing us that Havelock's career was based entirely on a 
rethinking of the culture of Ancient Greece as a response to the shift from orality to literacy, with 
profound implications for our understanding of the nature of the Western Philosophy tradition.  
In Abram's rendering of Parry and Havelock's ideas, the fundamentally oral ballads of 
Homer are completely dependent on rich natural imagery. The actions and moods of the gods 
portrayed within always coincide with changes in nature. The plot only advances in tandem with 
changes in nature- the changing status of characters occurs not just as metaphoric but also literal 
shifting tides. The way that emotional changes are equated to natural phenomena, shows for 
Abram, that pre-literate ancient Greece had a clearly animistic approach to the world. Aspects of 
the Phaedrus story, however, show us a radically less animistic conception of and relationship to 
nature emerging at the time. Abram's sees a deep contrast in the way Socrates relates to the natural 
world outside the confines of the city walls of Athens with what a later criticism of the technology 
of writing embedded within Socrates' telling of the legend of the Egyptian King Thamus. Early in 
the tale, Socrates openly declares his position that he views the company of his fellow philosophers 
as a superior environment to the countryside for the purposes of learning. Later on, however, he 
offers up a cautionary tale, recounting Thamus's reaction to the new technology of writing. Thamus 
directly criticizes a newfound reliance on written word. For him, writing as an externalized 
memory aid is the downfall of the mnemonic capacity of man. This allegory echoes Parry's 
findings regarding the Slavic singers. Upon transitioning to literacy, their ability to memorize and 
repeat information had become severely diminished. 
Abram links this to Havelock's understanding of Socrates’ dialectic method of challenging 
his students to think. He presents us with Havelock's notion that Socrates method 'was primarily a 
method for disrupting the mimetic thought patterns of oral culture.'26 As Abram tells, up until 
Socratic times, any act of speech was a locally situated phenomenon that was 'inseparable from 
the endlessly repeated stories, legends, and myths that provided many of the spoken phrases 
needed in one's daily actions and interactions.'27 In this regard, all memory was tied up in a 
continual process of storytelling. The storage of linguistic cultural memory occurred entirely 
within a matrix of continually repeated and revitalized stories. It was not 'exosomatizeable', to 
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borrow and expand a term from Stiegler. Thus, when Socrates would challenge his students to 
reflect back upon what they had just said, he was asking them to divorce the ideas of their words 
from the act of speaking itself. Asking people to distance themselves from their ideas was a 
fundamental displacement of the speaker and the idea enabled by the increased cultural influence 
of written words. This also served the function of removing knowledge from its situational context, 
explaining the rise of Platonic 'essences'. Abram explains that whereas ideas were up until that 
point 'experienced as living occurrences, as events, [...] as soon as such utterances were recorded 
in writing, they acquired an autonomy and a permanence hitherto unknown.'28 Neither Abram nor 
the classicists see Socrates' and Plato's methods as the original cause of this shift. Instead they 
understand them as representative of a larger trend occurring at the time. The important thing to 
note is that the birth of Western Philosophy represents the initial interface of oral and literate 
approaches to the world.   
Completing his reading, Abram returns to Merleau-Ponty to address the phenomenological 
implications of literacy. He positions Merleau-Ponty's bodily phenomenological perspective as a 
deep challenge to common literary theory and the post-structuralist philosophical accounts of 
literacy. According to Abram, the question of the more-than-human origins of our written word 
has been suppressed since the beginning of Western Philosophy and thus, ‘without a clear 
awareness of what reading and writing amounts to when considered at the level of our most 
immediate, bodily experience, any “theory” regarding the impact of literacy can only be 
provisional and speculative.’29 
Abram later expands Merleau-Ponty’s ideas to our understanding of space and time, however 
perhaps his most important implicit claim, hinted at above, is that the body is the necessary 
pathway to developing theory to help us understand the relationship between consciousness, 
language, and environment. In critiquing the influence of technologies of writing and calling for 
the primacy of the body, Abram offers a challenge to philosophers to critically assess the extent to 
which their thinking relies on technics. That he does so without ever mentioning that his book 
constitutes a philosophy of technology is notable and begs questions about how environmental 
philosophy at the time was unequipped to think technics. Insofar as Abram’s claim suggests a 
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‘suppression of technics’ in environmental philosophy at the end of the 20th century, it opens a 
natural link to Stiegler’s project.  
Abram claims that the technologies which form the basis of our thinking and memory 
obscure the ecological and bodily origins of our consciousness and diminish our ability to think 
and act reciprocally with our surroundings. Bernard Stiegler founds his philosophical project on a 
similar proposition. He argues that Western philosophy has largely suppressed the degree to which 
its very operations are dependent on its technological origin- that thinking is necessarily 
technological and that any understanding of technology must begin with an acknowledgement of 
this dynamic. This conceptual and structural parallel between their philosophies provides the 
necessary entry point to understanding the ways in which Stiegler’s main concepts are 
fundamentally aligned with Abram’s reading. 
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Stiegler’s Critique 
Originary Technicity, General Organology, and Pharmakon 
 
Stiegler’s writings consist of a continuously expanding corpus of books, articles, online 
lectures, and public talks, the latter of which tend to branch out and apply his thinking to a number 
of contemporary issues. As a counter-measure to this gregariousness, we can focus in on the core 
of his philosophy by looking primarily at his three foundational concepts and the way he builds 
them by extending the work of his predecessors. Stiegler’s originary technicity is a philosophical 
anthropological proposal that attempts to justify the assertion of the question of technics in 
philosophy by demonstrating how technics have shaped our physiology and consciousness in an 
evolutionary dynamic which predates the institution of philosophy. His general organology is a 
means to theorize the ongoing individuation processes of social, technological, ecological and 
psychological beings and speak to the relations between those beings. Individuation here is an 
ontological and psychological concept which speaks to the process by which a thing differentiates 
and is identified from other things. Stiegler’s contribution to the concept comes from the way he 
deploys it simultaneously at three primary registers; the psychic/neumonic or “I”), collective/social 
or “we”, and the technological.  By attempting to think identity and difference at multiple registers 
at the same time, Stiegler is able to explore how constituent parts of the human body (vital organs) 
relate to constituent parts of technical systems (artificial organs, technological prosthesis, or tools) 
which are both joined by organizations which also undergo individuation on a social and 
psychological register. This aesthetics of never-ending individuation applies Derrida’s thinking of 
difference to technology and organizations. Lastly, Stiegler also extends Derrida’s notion of 
pharmakon to show how we must think the ambivalent qualities of technology in order to orient 
our relation to it and engender nooetic (intellectual, spiritual) endeavor through the very 
technologies which disorient us. 
In his first published book, Technics and Time 1: The Fault of Epimetheus (1998), Stiegler 
explores the perceptual implications of our complex technological environments. The book begins 
by presenting a narrative of how human origins coevolved in relation to technics. Stiegler 
elaborates this central thesis by extending Heideggerian technics alongside the work of 
philosopher Gilbert Simondon, paleoanthropologist André Leroi-Gourhan, and historian of 
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technology, Bertrand Gille. Bringing together these thinkers, Stiegler challenges our 
understanding of the experience of time, arguing that technics are forms of inorganic and organized 
matter that form an externalized human memory and fundamentally constitute human temporality. 
He claims that because our physiology and neurology coevolved always in relation to technics, 
our entire notion of temporality is only, and has only ever been, accessed via technics. This 
epistemological claim is a means of critiquing and expanding Heidegger's work to propose a type 
of Dasein whose relationship to temporality is completely and always shaped by technics.  
Stiegler, following Husserl, continues, outlining a basic framework for the relationship 
between increasing technology use, increasing abstraction of thought, and the degradation of 
memory. Here, Stiegler focuses on numeracy. He criticizes the shift from geometric thinking to 
algebraic thinking catalyzed by the technology of numbers, or the process of numeration, claiming 
that it “is a loss of originary meaning and sight, a loss of the eidetic intentionality that underlies 
scientificity as such…”30 This loss is a type ‘eidetic blinding’, which, according to Stiegler, is a 
way by which we become increasingly displaced from meaning which relies on mental imagination 
of the physical world, and instead towards an method of inquiry, or a science, that is “meta-
physical”. This metaphysical thinking is a direct result of the “technicization” of science, which, 
in Stiegler’s words, “… is what produces loss of memory, as was already the case in Plato's 
Phaedrus.”31 Stiegler uses the Phaedrus dialogue to illustrate the contrast between hypomnesic 
logography and anamnesic memory, or between written record and recollection of experience.  It 
is this fundamental tension which Stiegler uses to define our relationship with technics as 
organological and pharmacological. in Stiegler’s broad definition, technics are beings which 
consist of organized inorganic matter, which evolve in relationship to humans and environment, 
and which form how we experience time and thought. The human condition is ‘always already 
technological’, proceeds through a co-evolutionary process with technical prosthesis, and is 
fundamentally both oppressive and empowering, offers a more nuanced assessment. This, he 
argues, resulting in a general proletarianization which is exacerbated by cognitive technologies, 
but also new opportunities for creative expression. 
                                                        
30 Bernard Stiegler, Technics and Time, 1: The Fault of Epimetheus (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1998), p. 3. 
31 Ibid. 
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Continuing his argument, Stiegler identifies where the question of technics lies in 
Heidegger’s work. Calculation is using the facts of the world to address one's concern for the future 
(for death). Our calculative approach to nature represents an attempt at control and domination of 
nature. This calculative approach stems from our historical engagement with technics. Technics 
allow us to gain control over our situation as temporal beings who inherit circumstance and 
anticipate the unknown circumstance of our own deaths. The shift from reason to calculation, what 
Stiegler refers to as the mathesis universalis of the Enlightenment, constitutes the shift in 
philosophy into a technical age. This technical age in philosophy "[...] brings subjectivity to its 
completion as objectivity."32 Showing the link between metaphysical thinking and 
instrumentalization is how Stiegler makes his argument that thought is constituted by technics, that 
"[t]he modern age is essentially that of modern technics."33  
Stiegler, building his case for the pharmacological nature of technics, identifies an essential 
ambiguity in Heidegger's work on technology, showing that in his earlier and most quoted works, 
technics are presented as the barrier to thinking and being, whereas in later works identify technics 
as that which enables thinking the nondual nature of time and being. Thus, Stiegler identifies in 
later Heidegger a shift into "thinking being without beings—that is, without Dasein."34 Stiegler 
then shows how this opens up Heidegger's thinking of technics beyond 'end and means' by 
exploring how Aristotle’s four causes of being may or may not apply to technics. For Heidegger, 
technics are not just means to a calculative end, they also have the ability to reveal truths, to 
disclose or unfold something that is hidden in the world. This capacity of technics for artistic or 
poietic ends is its value for authentic being. Stiegler intervenes here to define modern technics as 
those technics which do not primarily express the tendency for disclosure and being, and instead 
primarily function as a tool of the calculative reason of metaphysics. The irony here, according to 
Stiegler, is that in the name of control and dominion over nature and being, we use technics in a 
way that divorces us from nature and thus makes us more subject to the control of the tools we 
have invented. In simple terms, in forgetting that we are part of the nature we seek to control, we 
forgot that we are subject to the properties of the tools and techniques we design.  
                                                        
32 Ibid, p. 7. 
33 Ibid. Italics original. 
34 Ibid. 
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This line of argument shows how thinking technics in a nondual way constitutes 
environmental thinking. Once we identify as the nature we calculate, we can articulate in a 
sophisticated and analytical language the fact that the way we treat nature is necessarily the way 
we treat ourselves. This underlines the importance of reciprocity as a conceptual tool in Abram's 
work which is parallel to Stiegler’s understanding of and general call to active participation in the 
creation of symbolic forms which link humanity. If technics serve us best when fulfilling the 
function of revealing truths, then reciprocity becomes a foundational principle for an ethical use 
of technology, and, by extension, a basis for an artistic or poietic engagement with technology 
which elevates it to artistic purposes. Bringing together the calculative approach to technology 
with the artistic approach in a way which respects both purposes is thus the challenge for a 21st 
century philosophy of technology.  
Thinking technology thus becomes a philosophical bridge between the sciences and the 
arts. Instead of an enemy to science or to the modernist project, phenomenology becomes a means 
of deconstructing the barriers between the arts and sciences, thus invigorating or reenchanting 
modern science by showing it how to return to its edic origins in ratio. Phenomenological 
explication completes its deconstruction of modernist science and metaphysics via the 
reconstitution of its origins in subjective imaginary. Put optimistically, Phenomenology has 
opened the pathway for 21st century thinkers to rediscover reason, imagination, and participation 
as essential, but forgotten, methods in science. The task of an ecophenomenology which embraces 
technics, is discovering and inventing instances of the synthesis of scientific and artistic modes 
within the context of reciprocal and sensuous engagements with the more-than-human world. This 
means teaching ourselves to identify how technics shape our calculative behaviors and to show 
ourselves the full pharmacological limits of this disposition- exploring how modern technics drive 
us towards both absolute control and artistic revelation while at the same time subjecting us to that 
control and revealing aspects of ourselves. Articulated in terms of narrative, writing 
phenomenology means telling the same story multiple times and upon each iteration shifting the 
protagonist from humans to technics to nature, showing that the dynamics of control and revelation 
are nonlinear. 
Stiegler then presents how Heidegger's ontology of technology was adapted and potentially 
misunderstood by Marxist approaches put forth by Frankfurt School theorists. He focuses here on 
how Jürgen Habermas extends the theses of rationalization of Herbert Marcuse. Marcuse argued 
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that the rationalization which once formed a means of liberation from the bounds and threats of 
nature eventually came to permit a domination on the political level- that rationalization had 
become the guise of political domination. Marcuse uses this assessment as the basis to argue for a 
science which avoids the dominating tendencies of technics and is in communion with nature, 
which Stiegler sees as an 'error of interpretation' of Heidegger's thesis.35 Stiegler shows that in 
light of Marcuse, Habermas claims that technicization of rationality and communication becomes 
a means of hiding political domination inside of societal institutions, thus supplanting the societal 
norms of traditional societies with external control forces typical to modern life. Habermas creates 
an ideal of 'communicative action', a liberated form of communication which he contrasts to the 
instrumental reasoning at of our institutions. Stiegler sees this attempt of '[...] liberating 
communication from its technicization," as a form of analysis which remains indebted to, or 
'haunted by', the "founding positions of philosophy."36 Stiegler criticizes Habermas here by 
showing how although Habermas is in accordance with Heidegger that language becomes 
perverted through technicization, Habermas misses that Heidegger had transcended the 
metaphysical conceptualization of technics as a means in favor of an attempt to think technics as 
a being which co-constitutes our consciousness. Stiegler sees in this aspect of later Heidegger’s 
analysis the seeds of a thinking which skirts the need for metaphysics and permits us to think 
through the relationship of technics and time in a way that echoes but is "larger than the constitutive 
relationship between writing and citizenship."37 This is the ontological foundation of Stiegler's 
political project- the premise that thinking technics and time from a perspective of originary 
technicity will permit more important and dynamic thinking of our modern circumstances in which 
the borders between humans, technology, and nature are felt as blurred and in which technological 
innovation disrupts the capacity of our social and political institutions and outpaces culture.  
How technics disrupt and morph our experience of time and space, and thus our social 
cohesion and our very being is the core objective of Stiegler's work. Global ecological concerns 
and technological issues become one and the same question which we can examine via an 
exploration of displacement and deterritorialization which takes place continually at a result of 
accelerating technological innovation. Stiegler's self-proclaimed task is to examine the relationship 
                                                        
35 Ibid, p. 11. 
36 Ibid, p. 12. 
37 Ibid, p. 13. 
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of foresight and hope to distraction and fear via a rereading of the myth of Prometheus which 
emphasizes the role of his forgetful brother, Epimetheus. Stiegler establishes his originary 
technicity hypothesis through his focus on Heidegger's later understanding of technics and time. 
This becomes the foundation for a way to think how humans exteriorize memory via technics and 
thus achieve psychic and collective individuation in a way that pushes beyond the analytical limits 
of existentialism and phenomenology. How far Stiegler's project is able to push beyond 
phenomenology and create something truly original remains to be seen, however his premise is an 
essential development in the way we speak about technology within philosophy.  
Current Critiques of Abram and Stiegler 
 
In order to be able to understand the potential compatability of the author’s works, it is important 
to understand the limits of their work. Both suffer criticisms for the way they approach perception 
and reflection, however, ultimately, they overcome this to offer an affirmation of our present 
circumstance based in an attempt to overcome a Derridean ‘aporia of the origin’. The largest 
critique of Abram's work comes from Ted Toadvine, a scholar of Maurice Merleau-Ponty and 
leading voice in the ecophenomenology movement. Despite supporting the overall intentions of 
Abram's work, Abram is suspiciously absent from Toadvine and Brown’s Ecophenomenology: 
Back to the Earth Itself, a central ecophenomenology text from 2003.38 Toadvine later argues in a 
2005 article that Abram misunderstands Merleau-Ponty's position on the sign-symbol and mind-
body dialectics and relies heavily on a ‘fall from grace’ motif.39 This is a critique that finds echoes 
across ecotherapy scholarship. According to Toadvine, Abram has not thought beyond a mind-
body dualism, he has merely inverted the hierarchy. Abram has responded to Toadvine’s critique, 
claiming that although Toadvine has the best intentions and is a deep scholar of Merleau-Ponty, 
his claim that Abram ‘castigates’ verbal reflection misses the point and perhaps reflects a larger 
myopia in academic philosophy. Abram claims that his work, in being a hefty work of critical 
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reflection in and of itself, directly embraces reflection in both oral and literate cultures, and is only 
“critical of a particular kind of verbal reflection — that which forgets its own genesis in the 
interplay and tension between our animal body and the animate earth, a reflection that denies its 
own rootedness in the bodily field of experience.”40  
The most comprehensive critique of Stiegler’s work is from 2013. Stiegler and Technics: 
Critical Connections separates Stiegler’s work into five strands: anthropology, aesthetics, 
psychoanalysis, politics, and pharmacology.41 His philosophical anthropology begins with a 
rethinking of the origin of man through the idea of technogenesis and epiphylogenesis. In this 
volume, Richard Beardsworth argues that Stiegler glosses over what is necessary to put industrial 
capitalism in its place; that “Stiegler offers us at the same time a groundbreaking philosophy of 
technology and a frozen notion of political possibility.”42 According to Beardsworth, Stiegler’s 
work has made important impact on critical theory by opening up a new genealogy of technical 
supports which “sidesteps the totalizing Heideggerian gesture around technology [and] ultimately 
places Stiegler’s work outside the terms of deconstruction.”43 Beardsworth explains that by 
critiquing Husserl, Stiegler gives us new structure for ‘tertiary memory’ that “inscribes modern 
phenomenology in a materialist history which, at one and the same time, undoes the quasi-
formalism of the Derridean ‘trace’ and [....] proposes a re-writing of Marxist themes compatible 
with cognitive capitalism.”44 Lastly, Beardsworth praises Stiegler for going against a 
postmodernist tendency to reject post-Enlightenment reason and institutions, instead making the 
case for a “rationally substantive political invention.”45 
Fellow ecophenomenologists Ted Toadvine (2005) has accused Abram of romanticizing 
or even orientalizing oral cultures and has criticized his work for "its idealization of the body or 
'Flesh' as an agent of political change."46 While these critiques rightfully challenge some of the 
finer details of Abram’s work on language and the technology writing, they do not take away from 
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the overall impact of the work. Despite any criticisms, Abram's genealogy of technics set within a 
narrative of our ecological relationships opens a necessary door for ecophenomenology, and thus 
for environmental ethics and aesthetics general, to embraces technics. The political possibility of 
Abram’s work might not be understood via his use of Merleau-Ponty’s concept of the ‘Flesh’, but 
by the way his work opens new opportunities for dialogue with philosophy of technology which, 
taken in tandem with Stiegler’s politics, could engender new thinking about the impact of 
technologies of disorientation on our ecological relationships. If Stiegler is correct in his claim that 
technics are largely unthought-of in philosophy, then Abram's writings, even with their limitations, 
are fertile soil for scholarship at the intersection of philosophy of technology and environmental 
philosophy through a shared methodology in phenomenology and critique of technics.  
That technological competence can result from an understanding of the genealogies of 
technologies at hand- be they technologies of writing or information communication technologies, 
is communicated by their methods despite differences in temperament and genre. Stiegler’s 
concern for repairing our relationship to the world, just like Abram’s, focuses on perceptual and 
psychological enchantment through a larger awareness of the role technics play in forming our 
consciousness, yet he necessarily writes for a different audience. Aside from obvious language 
differences, the settings in which they chose to stage their narratives about technological encounter 
are the primary way in which their work is distinguishable into the distinct categories of 
environmental philosophy or philosophy of technology. The aesthetic differences in their writing 
seem to dominate how their work is positioned within the academic literature and is thus adapted 
or adopted into environmental or technological practices. Looking deeper and the structure of their 
arguments, not just the aesthetics of their writing, shows that the disciplinary divisions are 
secondary to what they share in common in terms of method and underlying conceptual 
frameworks. Both their work frame social issues within a larger narrative of technics which can 
contribute to conversations about the nature of perception and reflection in a narrative that 
simultaneously affirms the written word and symbolic interaction with the world while advocating 
for sensuous, embodied encounters with a "more-than-human" world which integrates technology.  
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Conceptual Compatibility  
 
Now that we have explored how both philosophers construct their foundational arguments and 
some basic criticisms, it is important to ask in what ways are their works similar and different and 
what might all this mean for an attempted synthesis of their ideas. In general, both Abram and 
Stiegler frame a similar problem with similar dynamics even while writing from different points 
of view and focusing on different contexts and situations in which the relationship between 
technics and spirit plays out. Firstly, at a foundational level, each work begins with a premise of 
crisis and disenchantment and a critique of technics and of philosophy that aims at revealing a 
possibility for perceptual and symbolic engagement with the world that is reciprocal and 
participatory. This possibility for spirited or enchanted engagement is precluded by overwhelming 
technological innovation and attentional disorientation which we can overcome through an 
expanded understanding of ourselves as always ecological and technological. Both authors lay out 
this expanded understanding primarily via the method of a philosophical genealogy.    
Both authors conceive of technics pharmacologically, as simultaneously an obstacle and 
pathway to existential possibility in our relationship to time and consciousness. They both revive 
and extend critiques present in Plato’s Phaedrus dialogue in order to problematize the way technics 
simultaneously constitute, engender, and debilitate our memories. External prosthetic memory aids 
permit the engagement with pasts that were not one’s own and thus open up the possibility for 
increased conflation of historicity and facticity. For Abram, the primary ill of this process is that 
it withdraws us from the logic and meaning inherent in sensual bodily encounters with the present 
moment in its infinite animate forms and beings. For Stiegler the issue is the same, though in his 
early works scarcely mentions beautiful phenomenon like bird song or the delicate rhythms of 
speech. He instead focuses more broadly on macro-social level ramifications, for instance, how 
our perceptual attention and libidinal drives get systematically exploited for profit by media 
industries, thus preventing our ability to instantiate ourselves as individuals.  
This process of industrial populism, according to Stiegler, prevents humans from 
distinguishing themselves from the collective identity and pursuing activities of authentic 
expression of the self (in a literal sense here). This grammatization of our speech habits, bodily 
gestures, social relationships, and general behaviors leaves us with disoriented, desensitized, and 
programmed spirits. His solution to this disindividuation is to directly acknowledge these 
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pharmacological dynamics and to explore the individuation process in the environments and 
technologies that help and hinder us. Through an exploration of a larger ontological individuation 
and relation of all beings, we may discover our capacity for individuation through new 
technologies and circumstances. Both authors agree that we are thoroughly “enchantable” and 
“disenchantable” beings who need to individuate and participate with other individuated beings in 
order to feel wonder. Though they focus on different contexts in which this might play out and on 
different instances of those individuated beings with which we reciprocally participate, they 
roughly agree on the mechanisms or patterns at play.  
Secondly, they both attempt to think individuation at multiple registers simultaneously and 
in this they both, in their own vernacular traditions, build upon the nondual thinking of relations 
present in the work of Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Derrida. Abram does this by demonstrating 
analogy between Merleau-Ponty’s thinking and the animism of indigenous and oral peoples and 
by linking human consciousness and technological evolution to ecological surrounds- to our bodily 
and sensual reciprocity with animals, atmosphere, and all things Other. Stiegler achieves a similar 
end within an aesthetic that is more intellectual and analytical, pulling on Derridian différance to 
express how humanity and culture are shaped by the processes of nature, attempting a 
grammatology. All in all, they offer us analogous concepts and strategies for shifting out of a 
general malaise which constitute a form of ‘technics’ in itself. The fact that their projects 
themselves can be understood as philosophical technics means they are subject to pharmacological 
and ecological dynamics, which has implications for a synthesis of their works. 
Both authors use the premise of crisis and the motif of the suppression of questions in 
philosophy as means of giving import to their arguments and allowing for a basic structure through 
which they can express those arguments. For Abram and Stiegler both, our contemporary situation 
is full of interwoven crises which are ontological in origin and require the revelation of suppressed 
questions in philosophy to be solved. This is a way to constitute the role of philosophy in society 
and justify its existence. Both philosophies are grounded in an assessment of modern social ills 
based in creative readings of the history of technics which implore readers to engage in deep and 
experimental ontological questioning. Abram’s work mostly focuses on the individual experiences 
of consciousness and prefers lyrical writing over overt political commentary while Stiegler’s work 
is essentially a post-Marxist critique of capitalism based on his own synthesis of the ontological 
claims of Heidegger, Simondon’s work on consciousness, and the anthropology of Leroi-Gourhan.  
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Their critical readings of technics are parallel assessments of the shift in the use of language 
from improvised, enchanted, reciprocal expressions of being with the physical world which takes 
place an ethereal and constantly renovated moment to an abstract and spatiotemporally disoriented 
experience marked by both by reduced and creativity and vitality and simultaneous new 
opportunities for creative expression.  We see an example of this in Stiegler’s critique of numeracy. 
He claims that the shift from geometry to numeracy in mathematical thinking resulted in a loss of 
imaginary capacity and remembering this rupture is a means of repairing our ties to the physical 
world which fuels thought. This is directly parallel to Abram’s overall analysis of the extent to 
which our experience of the moment is dependent on orthography. For instance, Abram details 
how we have lost touch with the ecological origins of our orthography which has made the long 
voyage from external markings or animal tracks which constitute landscapes as original texts, to 
increasingly self-referential and isolating technology of phonetic alphabets which obscure their 
own origins. Abram’s entire work remains focused on the technology of writing while Stiegler’s 
attempts to discuss the totality of technology in grammatological terms.  
The question of the relationship between literacy and thought is old as philosophy itself 
and is present in Abram’s reading of the story of Phaedrus as well. Though Abram does not use 
the terms hypomnesiac and amamnesic, they reach essentially the same conclusions as result of 
their readings. Simply put, our increased ability for abstract thinking is enabled by the technologies 
we invent, however what we gain in conceptual agility we lose in capacity for memory and for 
connection to the phenomena we perceive. Abram explores this tension as the root cause of our 
disenchantment; technology has drawn us away from our bodily intuition and thus eclipses an 
originary reciprocity with our ecological contexts. Abram never engages Derrida’s work for 
extended periods of time, and when he does, he is very critical and fundamentally misunderstands 
Derrida’s position as ignoring the ecological origins of writing. Abram notes that Derrida’s notion 
of trace might not work if we consider the origins as non-human, but this simply misreads 
Derrida’s understanding of the challenge of seeking origins. Abram is a closer ally to Derrida than 
he might have portrayed himself to be.  
Abram and Stigler both come to similar conclusions about the relation of technics to human 
consciousness and, according to Stiegler’s definition of the term, Abram’s rendering of technology 
also amounts to an organology, though Abram does not use that term.  Though they both essentially 
construct an organological understanding of technics, Abram uses this organology to different ends 
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than Stiegler. He uses this framework to advocate for a return to the vitality, spontaneity, and 
offered by the pre-literate expressions of language. Another major parallel in their works is the 
claim that reciprocal participation with the world is occluded by technological disorientation. Both 
authors agree that our psychic disenchantment comes from a lack of cultural and conceptual 
equipment to participate in our environments reciprocally and our forgetting of our technological 
origins is culprit. Rapid change in technological innovation has left us living in a physical world 
to which our cultures have yet to adapt. In David Abram's thinking, as literate peoples, we are 
caught in a tailspin of intellectualism, abstraction, and reflection which eclipse truer, sensuous 
encounters with the living, breathing world all around us. If we can learn to turn down the volume 
on our anthropocentrism and abandon an addiction to reflection in favor of perception, we will 
readily understand that we are not standing on the earth, nor do we live in environments, rather we 
are expressions of the animate earth and co-create our environments in every encounter.  
While Abram’s critique focuses largely on the body as a locus of meaning and encourages 
sensuous bodily perception as a way to combat the pitfalls of technological life, Stiegler 
understands our physiology, and thus our consciousness, as technological in origin, thus opening 
up new possibilities for thinking an individual politics of technology which avoids a myth of pure 
origins. For instance, Abram’s use of Merleau-Ponty’s concepts of “flesh” and “chiasm” are 
analogous to the ‘organology’ Stiegler employs to understand the co-evolutionary relationship 
between human bodies and technology. Stiegler brings this organology into the present moment 
arguing that our very consciousness, which is organologically related to technology, is coopted by 
the dynamics industrial populism. Our ability to constitute ourselves as individuals is arrested at 
the same time our attention and desires are exploited for profit in an economy based on cognitive 
capitalism. However, despite this politicized reading, Stiegler does not allow for a ‘pure’ origin 
that is not fundamentally technological. He more thoroughly deconstructs this hierarchy, while 
Abram mostly inverts it. The implications of deconstructing a myth of ‘a-technological’ origins 
may be an extremely useful contribution to environmental thought in the 21st century, contributing 
to Abram’s goal of overcoming nature-culture binaries while at the same time challenging the 
episteme-techne divide which has plagues Western philosophy since Plato. Abram’s concept of 
reciprocity is analogous to Stiegler’s notion of participation, and it seems that the prescription for 
direct, sensuous, reciprocal encounters with nature alleviates the stress that comes from the 
liquidation of our shared symbolic forms. Despite criticisms, both thinkers implicitly and expressly 
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challenge much of post-structuralist thought in an important way, engaging many of its central 
concerns; the hierarchical conceptualization of speech and writing, and orality and literacy, time 
and space, and the relationship of language to perception. Abram’s approach to language and 
ecology can be read as partially- if not predominantly- a phenomenological approach to technology 
embedded within an environmentalist or ecophilosophical aesthetic. Vice versa, Stiegler’s return 
to Heidegger represents an attempt to overcome the limits of his post-structuralist inheritance 
which, to Stiegler, had proved inadequate for conceptualizing technology. In this, both of their 
responses to post-structuralist thought can be understood vernacular iterations or extensions of a 
non-dual approach to philosophy of technology which extend Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and 
Derrida’s attempts at thinking relation in the 20th century.   
Post-structuralist philosophy had been in constant engagement with the phenomenological 
tradition and drew in implicit and explicit ways from nondual philosophies from Eastern traditions. 
This is most evident in the work of Heidegger, but scholarship on deconstruction and non-duality 
shows that the work of Derrida, Merleau-Ponty, and their contemporaries can be articulated as 
nondual philosophy.47 Abram uses Merleau-Ponty’s bodily phenomenology to challenge the work 
of Derrida, who was a direct mentor to Stiegler. Well-known as a thorough reader of his 
contemporaries, Derrida wrote surprisingly little about Merleau-Ponty’s work. Understanding why 
he chose to engage or to not engage Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of the body and philosophy 
of language could offer some further clues and context for Abram’s specific critiques of Derrida’s 
work and allow for scholarship on Stiegler’s extension and reworking of Derrida’s ideas about 
writing and memory. Abram’s critiques of Derrida are brief and lie primarily in footnotes. Given 
how little Abram directly addresses Derrida’s work, it seems reasonable to assume that his 
criticisms are mostly function as provocations and challenges to dominant trends in the philosophy 
at the time which were not yet directly engaging ecological themes. This complex web of 
relationships between philosophers and the work of their contemporaries requires deep scholarship 
in its own right. Furthermore, the relationships in philosophy evoke the nonlinear dynamics of 
ecological systems which an ecophenomenologcal approach to philosophy itself might address. 
Taking a look at how they represent vernacular or idiomatic examples of nondual 
philosophy helps us theorize what the potential limits and possibilities of their works might be 
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beyond their original contexts. As critical responses to post-structuralist philosophy, Abram and 
Stiegler’s projects focus on the non-dual relationship between humans, environment, and 
technology.  The fact that their thinking is so productive and well-received shows that there are 
multiple pathways to approaching the same subject matter. Furthermore, the overwhelming 
commonalities in their arguments is reason for philosophers to overtly acknowledge 
commonalities and shared motivations with the work of others.  
Demonstrating the differences between the work of two philosophers is a necessary aspect 
of identifying unique contributions to philosophy. However, respecting individuation, we still must 
not over-emphasize the uniqueness of individual philosophers in a way that denies the essential 
collaboration that underlies and strengthens philosophy overall. This tension between 
individuation and collaboration is certainly inside Abram and Stiegler’s thinking. At the core of 
how they understand the dynamics between humans, environment, and technology is co-
individuation. Bringing together their concepts means that proper psychological individuation 
requires deep sensuous, reciprocal encounters with the more-than-human world and that we can 
engender this participation by recognizing the dynamics of modern technology as fundamentally 
pharmacological in nature. Respecting these concerns, the concepts within their works becomes 
an important framework with which to explore co-individuation in the phenomenon of philosophy 
itself.  
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Chapter Three: 
Abram and Stiegler’s Pharmacy  
 
Having diagnosed social and psychological disease as fundamentally perceptual and 
technological in nature, Abram and Stiegler’s critical readings of technics both amount to 
ecological, organological, and pharmacological approaches to the question of technology. 
Ultimately, though each uses his basic framework to advocate for slightly different responses to 
the challenges of technology, the multiple structural, conceptual, and rhetorical parallels reveal a 
foundational, underlying method, a ‘technics of repair’ common to both their reenchantment 
philosophies.  We can combine their essential medicine into a complex brew which helps us 
dissolve the conditions of our malaise and direct us back towards reciprocal, spirited participation 
with the world. The essential ideas put forth are two-fold. The first argument is that technical 
competence or knowing regarding our contemporary technologies is made possible in part by 
originary thinking (that is, techne and episteme are inherently codependent). The second idea is 
that a pharmacological and ecological understanding of philosophy itself calls for epistemic 
humility and a relinquishing of the tendency for control and calculation in philosophy (a techno-
ecophenomenology necessarily proceeds by deconstruction). These two notions taken together 
offer basic ways for 21st century philosophers to think with and against Abram and Stiegler.  
Demonstrating how their approaches to environment and technology can be understood as 
vernacular iterations of nondual philosophies of reenchantment based in a reading of technics 
permits the construction of a philosophical approach to environment and technology which both 
understands the body to be the primary locus of perception at the same time that it is necessarily 
technological. Post-structuralist thinking of non-dual relations which Abram and Stiegler offer us 
in their own idioms helps us think ourselves out of epistemological hubris and overcome our own 
desire to know what is yet to come before it comes. In Heideggerian terms, it helps us put to rest 
our long-running and historically-ingrained desire to calculate and control. To predict the future 
can be understood as an attempt to gain control over the non-existent. In this logic, the notion itself 
is absurd and the spirit is liberated from the weight of existing in a state of perpetual failing to 
predict the unpredictable. 
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That they constitute vernacular or idiomatic presentations of non-dual ontology allows us 
to put aside any of the flaws or limitations to their individual arguments and focus on new 
possibilities that can arise through brining their philosophies into encounter. The fact that two 
works from different disciplinary backgrounds yet are so deeply compatible is reason enough to 
forgive minor flaws or rhetorical limitations. Simply put, while not perfect, their projects are 
certainly “compatible enough” to move towards one another. It opens the possibility for an 
approach to reenchantment that understands philosophy itself as a phenomenon we engage which 
also has pharmacological and ecological dynamics.  
Lastly, an important way to make use of this encounter as a ‘technics of repair’ is to use 
Abram and Stiegler to help overcome a type of apocalyptic or eschatological tendency in 
environment and technology narratives. By casting the origin of our current techno-eco-social 
disorientation into the mysterious domain of aporia, a hybrid of their work enables us to 
acknowledge how little we can know about the where from which our present moment emerges 
and thus how little we can predict the where that we will be in a future present. How we can deploy 
this radical epistemic humility to alleviate a tendency to think about ubiquitous technology and 
precarious climate change apocalyptically is as difficult an endeavor as we wish to make it. In 
philosophical writing, this might mean tracing the origins of the relationship between the fear, 
faith. And the unknowable.  
Proving that this synthesis of their work is a worthy endeavor required a clear 
understanding of the constraints and affordances of the works at hand in order to avoid isolated 
discourse or idle speculation about metaphysics. We can now move ahead assured that we are 
making philosophy is internally coherent and rigorous while being relevant and impacting beyond 
itself. Applying their concepts to the object of philosophy itself allow us to orient ourselves in 
relation to philosophy and construct a basic synthesis of their concepts.  
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Technical Competence via Originary Thinking 
 
The first argument is that knowing how to use modern technologies in an ethical way now takes 
precedence over knowing how they work, especially given the fast pace of innovation, the fact that 
modern technology is designed to be extremely intuitive, and the impending Artificial Intelligence 
revolution. Much of contemporary philosophy of technology (see Borgman, Dreyfus, Feenberg 
and Higgs) draws from Heidegger to create ethical approaches to philosophy and there is a strong 
tendency to argue that meaningful engagement with technology is derived from learning their inner 
mechanics through direct manipulation. There is no doubt to this, however achieving technical 
competence with the ever-expanding number of technologies which abound is practically 
impossible. Any attempt to do so would amount to shifting from a state of passive disorientation 
at the hand of industrial populism to an active sense of overwhelming impotence. Thus, a 
contemporary technological competence means knowing what to technologies for when we 
encounter them. In this sense, thinking technological origins permits technical know-how which 
is a sort of techne by way of episteme. 
The repair technics, which amount to a strategy guide for reenchantment, has at its core the 
project of the deconstruction of the self. The purpose of this deconstruction is to individuate from 
the collective in order to shift beyond what Heidegger saw as our broken and inauthentic approach 
to being. it might be understood as a means of approaching the Buddhist concept of anatta, or “non-
self’, in the language of post-structuralist philosophy. We know generally from Eastern thought 
and from thinkers like Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Derrida, that suffering is largely a case of 
mistaken identity. Oftentimes we are unable to see past the illusion of separation between all 
things. As a result, we experience the beings we encounter as Other and miss half the equation. 
We fail to see the extent to which we are shaped by the phenomena we perceive, forgetting the bi-
directionality of the exchange. The self needs to be deconstructed in so far as it is posited in a 
hierarchical relationship to that which it encounters. A certain yielding needs to be substituted for 
an ethos of calculation and control.  
In the context of Abram and Stiegler’s work, arriving at this position requires a trip to the 
origin of our relationship to technology and to ecology. We can never reach this origin, but the act 
of remembering is essential to understanding how to engage the technologies in a way that serves 
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creative self-expression, individuation and connection. This permits us to combat a general 
disenchantment via disengagement.  
Abram and Stiegler’s complimentary philosophies amount to a history of technologies of 
participation with our environments in their natural, spatial, temporal, and social expressions. 
Abram showed us how the evolution of the technology of the written word changed our 
relationship to our own embodiment and to the reciprocal exchange with the ecological 
environments which constitute our very consciousness. Invoking the story of Phaedrus, Abram 
and Stiegler make the age-old claim that we pay the price for technologies of exosomatic memory 
with a specific type of forgetting. This tension between the polarities of remembering and 
forgetting was an issue at the advent of literacy which also coincided and coevolved with 
philosophy. Stiegler’s assessment that technics have always formed the constitution of our 
consciousness applies to technics in general and most centrally to philosophy, to technics of 
writing which permit disembodied, displaced, and temporally complex thinking. This compromise 
with our adopted technical prosthetics is at the center of a pharmacological dynamic of attraction 
and resistance, oppression and liberation.  
To combat this forgetting and to redeem some of what we may lose through technics, 
Abram and Stiegler offer us a strategy: a genealogy of our technological circumstance which is in 
essence a critique of origins and an act of remembering. We can trace the origins of technologies 
via the technologies themselves, and, in acknowledging their changing nature, construct a 
historical philosophical narrative as an elaborate and highly technical act of remembrance. This 
act of remembrance offers us coherence across time and allows us to commune with and develop 
kinship with the past while recognizing that we are inseparable from the technologies and 
ecologies which shape our consciousness. This past with which we seek communion is accessible 
in the present moment through the direct experience of technics and environments themselves 
which occurs concurrently with our encounter with concepts. In this sense, we could make an 
argument that a property of technics is that they afford their own self-remembering, just as a 
property of ecologies is that they afford a reading into their pasts. Whether or not we can trace 
those pasts with a purely perceptual engagement- without the aids of language or concepts- is a 
topic to be explored below, however, we know that at minimum we can trace the histories of our 
conceptual and linguistic understanding of phenomena.  
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In written language, we have preserved linguistic and conceptual phenomena which are 
themselves records of moments or events. The nature of those moments or events are unknowable 
in totality, but we are able to experience the records of experiences. This recursively becomes a 
sort of knowledge by proxy, a “knowing about” something as opposed to a direct “knowing” of a 
phenomenon in the present.  In this sense, their works show how historical thinking about 
technologies supports both our epistemological and technical competence regarding those 
technologies. This critiquing the origins of a technology a necessary, though unsuspected, element 
which supports our technical competence. Historical accounts of relations become a counter-
measure to disorientation: a sort of techne by way of episteme. Overcoming the ancient divide 
between episteme and techne is the first step in administering this basic philosophical medicine. 
To do so, we need to conceive of the history of our consciousness as originarily technical in 
Stiegler’s sense, at the same time that it is originarily ecological, as shown by Abram’s look at the 
ecological origins of language.  
To encapsulate both technical and ecological origins, we might offer modifications to 
Merleau-Ponty’s ‘flesh’ and ‘chiasm’ which simultaneously evoke the body, the environment, and 
technics. To Abram and Stiegler’s projects we might add notions of ‘originary reciprocity’ and 
‘knowledge as skill’ which can work for both technological and ecological discourse by 
challenging the episteme-techne divide. This helps us to use their arguments to understand 
philosophy itself as a technic which can be assessed in pharmacological and ecological terms.  
Epistemic Humility and Theory and Practice 
 
This opens the doors to the second argument, which asks: How does understanding Philosophy as 
a phenomenon we encounter which conforms to ecological dynamics expand our definition of self 
and lead to compassionate philosophy? Reenchantment requires not just reciprocity and 
participation with nature and technology, but with philosophy and its methods. The aesthetics of 
the writing of philosophy are crucial for achieving its proposed goals. In this way, Abram's project 
achieves its goal both with the structure of its narrative and its use of lyrical and sensuous language. 
Stiegler's narrative is as fascinating as it is long and complicated. In a sense this both speaks to 
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and spites the objective of his project to reduce the disorientation that results from innovative 
technics.  
Notably, the analysis from chapter one suggests that their projects resist application beyond 
their local contexts. This can be an underlying strength to their projects, however, insofar as they 
fail to acknowledge the local character to their works, instead operating under presumptions of 
universality and, in Stiegler’s case, a tendency towards prophecy, their projects are limited. Laying 
out a synthesis of their ideas which is overtly local in character and which acknowledges 
epistemologically humility would do justice to the pharmacological and ecological natures of 
philosophy and would render their projects more powerful and graceful.  
What might we do with the ‘facticity’ of our encounter with Abram and Stiegler’s writing? 
What possibilities are opened up by understanding their writing as naturally in the past and our 
encounter of it as necessarily in the present? An ecopharmacological approach to their works 
means a combination of what Abbinett (2018) terms Stiegler’s “Technological Dasein”, with 
embodied perceptional and reciprocal encounter with their works.  
Epistemic humility in philosophy, when approached pharmacologically, means in part 
maintaining the question of dosage as a priority question in any endeavor. Not necessarily a call 
for moderation in the sense of equal balance, but a call for moderation in the sense of keeping an 
eye on dosage. Understanding philosophy as a contextual anthropotechnics which functions both 
as therapy and as a strategy by which we prepare for the unknown divests it of its sacred role and 
puts it to use as a tool which we use in specific scenarios to address the fact that unknowability is 
coming. Philosophy, in this way, becomes a technic which promotes conceptual adaptability and 
flexibility in its users, the conceptual counterpart to physical therapy and mobility practices, which 
allow us to address previous traumas, weak-points, and rigid habits of thought to work towards a 
goal of preparedness for inevitable improvisation. This pragmatic approach to philosophy can 
cultivate epistemic humility through an acknowledgment of its technical utility. An approach to 
philosophy as technics does not necessarily need to decide on what is a proper pursuit of truth or 
whether or not philosophy conveys those truths. So long as it is approached as a technic which is 
ecological and pharmacological, it can to orient users towards the world while embracing that it is 
an immanent phenomena of that world and not a theoretical or hypothetical thing apart. Its capacity 
to orient those who practice it, then, comes not from absolute truth claims, but instead from its 
ability to increase competence through adaptable methods which prepare us for improvisation in 
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the ever-becoming world from which those methods also comes. This approach understands every 
phenomenon involved in co-constitutive and simultaneous non-linear dynamic.  
One way by which this philosophical approach might proceed is in a similar manner to 
which new movements are learned in contemporary music, dance, or natural movement seminars: 
by isolation and grammaticization of a  pattern, integration into a larger sequence or syntax, and 
then exploration and refinement within a context of improvised free expression (poeitic 
environment). The relationship between each of the three phases is something roughly parallel to 
the relationship between the basic educational arts of grammar, dialectic, and rhetoric. A 
conceptual fact is introduced and accepted, then it is analysed and deconstructed to understand its 
robustness and its relationship to a larger conceptual ecosystem. Lastly, the knoweldge or 
competency gained by the first two activities is explored and communicated.  
There seems to be great carry over in the application of pedagocial methods between 
creative fields. Teaching methods from one art discipline can be identified, understood in terms of 
where it might fit into a larger curriculum, and then deployed in a real-life scenario and refined. 
Education, in this regard, is understood as simply another domain, practice, craft, or art which 1) 
proceedes via a series of identifiable assumptions and 2) has success and failure criteria which can 
be evaluated in terms of affective engagement (the duration, intensity, tone and rhtyhm of the 
emotional vitality of parties during any given activity) and benefit from direct and shared 
acknowledgement of those assumptions, procedures, and criteria by all parties involved. Rather 
than destorying any of the mystery or magic of arts education, an understanding of pedagocial 
technics by all parties involved deconstructs the student-teacher heirarchy whilst allowing both 
parties to succeed in those resepctive roles through clearer understanding of the reciprocal 
dynamics of the encounter. 
21st Century Metaphors for Philosophers 
 
In What is Philosophy? (1996), Gilles Deleuze brilliantly distinguishes wisdom from philosophy 
and proclaimed that the purpose of a philosopher is to build concepts. Nowadays there is talk of 
philosophers as concept engineers48 who ought to work in technological research and 
                                                        
48 See Luciano Floridi, The Philosophy of Information (OUP Oxford, 2013), and Herman Cappelen, Fixing 
Language: An Essay on Conceptual Engineering (Oxford University Press, 2018). 
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development.49 These metaphors clearly reflect an appeal to the technological and to the 
calculable. One wonders how Heidegger might feel about his intellectual descendants. Our authors 
hint at slightly different roles at the borders of these trends. Stiegler’s “realignment of techno-
human relations put writing at the epicenter of contemporary and projected cultural and ontological 
transformations.”50 His philosophical project offers the sense of philosopher as one who cares 
through writing. Though stylistically different, Abram might very well agree. Far from a concept 
engineer, he operates more as a lyricist and tour guide, directing our attention by simply walking 
the trails he wants us to and pointing. And so, these two philosophers offer similar projects with 
different skins. Recognizing that it is mostly superficial tone and language which keeps them apart 
in the literature, this thesis sees an attempt at a critical and synthesis of their projects as a way to 
both overcome the limitations of their individual works while making the case for philosophy that 
more explicitly incorporates ecological, technological, and psychological inquiry in both content, 
structure, and methodology. 
Each discipline offers unique perspectives and tools to address human wellbeing.  
Exploring Abram’s approach to phenomenological thinking, which embraces ecological, 
psychological, and technological themes alongside Stiegler’s understanding of how technology 
alienates and disorients at the same time that it liberates and permits self-expression, dissolves 
boundaries where they do not need to be. A synthesis of their works permits intellectual thinkers 
to overcome conceptual blocks towards technology in relation to ecology, psychology, and artistic 
expression and perhaps alleviate psychological or emotional resistances to their environments. 
Understanding philosophy to be a large organism or ecosystem allows us to see the resistances 
between individual philosophies as part of a larger homeostatic dynamic. Respecting the 
distinction between philosophy and other wisdom traditions forms the core of a pharmacological 
understanding of philosophy.  
  
                                                        
49 Don Ihde, Experimental Phenomenology: An Introduction (Albany: State University of New York Press, 
1986). 
50 Tinnell, John. “Grammatization: Bernard Stiegler’s Theory of Writing and Technology.” Computers and 
Composition 37 (September 1, 2015): 132–46. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.compcom.2015.06.011. 
 
  55 
Conclusion  
Technology, Ecology, Philosophy: The Pathless Path 
 
Across the globe, an increasing number of humans live urban, hyper technologized, highly-
mediated lives shaped by the dynamics of consumer capitalism and what Stiegler terms ‘industrial 
populism’- a state in which media technologies synchronize the behavior and temporal perception 
of large populations in an unprecedented manner. If Stiegler is correct in his assessment that our 
ability to individuate is stunted by a ‘cognitive capitalism’ which constantly solicits and arrests 
our attention to make profit, then we need conceptual tools and strategies to combat this if we wish 
to create meaningful and expressive lives.  
Creating these new tools, paradigms, and strategies requires a rethinking of the ecological, 
organological and pharmacological nature of technics and of philosophy itself. Abram’s 
ecophenomenology offers us a method to investigate and make meaning from the "more-than- 
human world" beginning always with the body. At the same time Stiegler offers that we can find 
the solution to our problems in the very same technologies that oppress us. Critically engaging 
each approach in terms of the other can take us to new places and help us outgrow our current 
problems. One sword sharpens the other. 
By creating an ecophenomenology that embraces technics, Abram delivered environmental 
thinkers better conceptual resources with which to build environmental ethics and aesthetics. 
Thanks in part to Abram’s work, at the current moment, environmental thinkers in the North 
American tradition have more methodological tools with which to construct new narratives that 
address the psychological and perceptual aspects of climate destruction in a holistic manner 
without relying on myths of pristine, non-human nature.  
If the knowledge produced by the methods of ecophenomenology gains legitimacy in the 
eyes of people who spend most of their lives in cities (including politicians, media-makers), then 
there are longer-term implications of ecophenomenology for American culture and American 
environmental policy. By ensuring that this new thinking can stand up to the enormous narrative 
importance of technology in modern lifeworlds, a phenomenology which can incorporate technics 
with ecological themes will be an increasingly important philosophical tool for interpreting and 
reflecting on deep ecological, technical, and social issues.  
  56 
As we can see from a close reading and critical analysis of Abram and Stiegler’s works, 
despite aesthetic differences and large, universalizing claims present in their arguments, they have 
a high level of compatibility which speaks to the potential of philosophy to bring together 
environmental, technological, and psychological thinking. Their projects demonstrate structural 
and conceptual parallels in their assessment of what caused our modern malaise while offering 
slightly divergent, yet complimentary suggestions of how we should work to overcome that state 
and achieve meaningful lives. Abram’s emphasis on the body and reciprocity with our 
environment provides a thinking of the sensual and physical that can add richness to Stiegler’s 
more cerebral and macro-reductive approach to organology and technological prosthesis.  
Despite these basic commonalities, Abram’s work has been largely engaged by 
environmental philosophers while Stiegler has not, and vice versa Stiegler’s concerns are largely 
engaged by those who work on techno-social problems which tend to be urban and industrial in 
focus and which give limited narrative or conceptual space to nature or wilderness. This lack of 
dialogue begs the questions: to what extent are their critiques of technics synthesizable and to what 
extent are they useful or limited beyond their local social contexts?  
Because there is no known work which attempts to put their philosophies in dialogue, 
bringing their different approaches together can remove unnecessary disciplinary boundaries 
between the work of environmentalists, artists, philosophers, and technologists and to show how 
these seemingly disparate endeavors can work together. Blurring the aesthetic and methodological 
barriers between disciplines is a crucial step in building a phenomenological account of the 
development of civilization which embraces an aesthetic and technological reciprocity with nature 
and which can speak meaningfully about technics as an ecological phenomenon itself.  
This encounter between continental philosophy and American environmental concerns 
provides useful strategies for thinking of the relations between nature, technology and psychology 
through the lens of co-individuation. The comparison shows that French and American thinking 
about technics is fundamentally compatible given parallel concerns for these themes and 
overlapping philosophical histories. These open gates invite transformation and cross fertilization 
within philosophy and encourages philosophers to see their own work as undergoing a continual 
process of co-individuation new communication technologies, local natural environments, and 
philosophical traditions.  
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The key offering brought forth from the encounter between their work is a radical epistemic 
humility that begins with an understanding of the limits of originary thinking. Part of this process 
is direct acknowledgement of reciprocal co-individuation as a property of any encounter between 
beings (human, technological, ecological). Additionally, crucial takeaway is that we can cultivate 
pharmacological understanding of philosophy itself as a communication technic with the capacity 
to connect/edify, to divide/alienate, and to be a scapegoat for others. This last step is crucial to 
cultivating a lightness and freeness of thought that inoculates us against our own ideological 
tendencies.  
In regard to the academy, the above offerings broadcast a demand for more encounters 
between environmental texts in French and English, not to mention other languages and cultural 
traditions. This more translations and yet-thought of institutions which can encourage cultural 
exchange using modern technology. For instance, both Abram and Stiegler can be understood as 
contributing to a rich history of French environmental thought regarding the relationship of spirit, 
liberty, and societies of technology and control. These themes have been put forth in the 20th 
century by such thinkers as Jacques Elull and Bernard Charbonneau. Thinkers like Charbonneau 
have seen recent increase in translations into English, however he remains little known in the 
Anglophone world. Academics working between cultures are primed to advocate for more 
interwoven histories. It is important for environmental and technological writing to be exchange 
in a way which accords to the concerns philosophies themselves.  
Tasked with addressing technology at the level of the individual, psychological, and 
perceptual, Abram and Stiegler each trace similar phenomena while presenting distinct solutions 
to the problems they outline depending on context and setting. Challenging the local contexts of 
their works will allow environmental philosophers who wish to better engage notions of the body 
in relationship to technology and nature to benefit from Stiegler's framing of the problem of 
industrial populism. It can also help educators of all stripes who wish to build 21st century 
pedagogies to empower their students to navigate unforeseeable political, environmental, and 
perceptual realities. Additionally, Stiegler’s work on the industrialization of time and the symbolic 
can help progress debates within ecophenomenology about the political nature of the perceptual 
and may help articulate pathways to a “Flesh” with increased political agency. Understanding how 
to politicize the perceptual or the aesthetic can help therapists, artists, technologists, educators, to 
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make work that addresses environmental degradation and ubiquitous technology at the level of the 
individual or perceptual.  
In a similar vein, Stiegler’s thought can contribute to environmental philosophy at large 
and scholars have the opportunity to explore how far his political philosophy might work beyond 
modern-day France and the EU. Given that French thought has informed the American experience 
of environment and government since the birth of the US as a nation, the compatibility is clear. 
Engaging the works of a broader cadre of French environmental philosophers, a category to which 
Stiegler clearly belongs, would equip contemporary environmental philosophers in the US with 
sophisticated conceptual. Stiegler’s originary technicity, general organology can help 
conceptualize current technological and political themes in the US as they relate to national myths 
of origins. Stiegler’s originary technicity thesis challenges the utility of Romantic concepts of 
wilderness and purity which have been essential to North American culture and which shapes 
environmental writing, philosophy, and conservation policy. Deep conceptual encounters between 
these philosophies can allow us to better assess current European and American responses to 
environmental confusion and technological innovation and offer nuance to those responses. 
It might be said that nothing sells like a good crisis. There has been a soft-spoken 
background concern motivating this project, the idea that philosophy itself is a Faustian bargain. 
Abram and Stiegler’s books have enormous ability to pull readers from the stagnant eddies and 
reconnect them with the world, but only if one can eventually put the books down. This thesis 
attempted to understand the pharmacologically correct dosages of contemplation and action and 
an immunological understanding of the relationship between mass-movements, concepts, and 
intellectual individuation. Abram and Stiegler convincingly diagnose the origins of these most 
popular globe-sized crises. This thesis sought to problematize the use of disenchantment and crisis 
as conceptual and rhetorical devices in philosophical writing. What is the relationship between 
these concepts and a tendency towards urgency and action in contemporary philosophy? 
The result of this encounter, hopefully, is an evenness of heart: a willingness to embrace 
the gifts of modernist and post-modernist thought with gratitude while forging new paths with each 
successive individuation. 21st century philosophers who successfully slay their fathers and their 
father’s fathers will be able to proceed with the tools of the Enlightenment in one hand, and those 
of post-modernity in the other. Abram and Stiegler have shown us that reenchantment means 
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continued participation with one’s surround. Staying enchanted via philosophy means knowing 
when to draw one’s sword, and when to return it to one’s sheath. 
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